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ABSTRACT 
 
I investigate whether firms’ stock liquidity is associated with their auditor choices and 
audit fees. Stock liquidity can increase monitoring by helping institutional investors 
overcoming free-rider problems to intervene in management decisions. Stock liquidity 
can also facilitate block formation and costly information acquisition, which enhances 
corporate governance through the threat of exit by institutional investors. Given that 
stock liquidity can enhance corporate governance, firms with higher stock liquidity may 
have incentives to hire higher quality auditors and pay higher audit fees to satisfy the 
demand of institutional investors. Consistent with these arguments, I find that firms with 
liquid stocks are more likely to appoint higher quality auditors such as Big 4 and industry 
specialist auditors, and they also pay significantly higher audit fees. These results are 
robust to alternative measures of liquidity and industry specialists. These results are also 
robust to the control of the endogeneity of stock liquidity. This paper contributes to the 
accounting literature by providing empirical evidence of the role of stock liquidity on 
auditor choice and audit pricing. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper investigates whether stock liquidity can explain U.S. firms’ auditor choice, 
and audit fees paid by these firms. After the failure of Arthur Andersen and the passage 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, regulators have expressed concern about the high 
degree of concentration in the audit market and encouraged public companies to consider 
using smaller accounting firms (Cox 2005; McDonough 2005). However, even for most 
clients of Arthur and Andersen, they still switched to other Big 5 auditors after the 
scandal (Barton 2005). Proposals to reduce concentration of audit market have been put 
forth proposals by academic and business groups. However, none of them was widely 
supported, since market participants raised questions about the overall effectiveness, 
feasibility, and benefit of these proposals1. Therefore, the concentration in audit market 
continues for public companies. For example, there are totally 1077 U.S. accounting 
firms that are currently registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB)2, only around 530 firms of them have audited public companies, and Big 4 
audit approximately two thirds of public companies3. Since the potential adverse effects 
of further concentration of audit market, it is meaningful to explore the attributions to the 
companies’ auditor choice. 
 
Information asymmetry between principals and agents provides opportunities for agents 
to promote their own interests at the expense of the interests of the principals (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). In order to minimize such behavior, principals establish systems to 
monitor agents, and audit is one of the tools available for principle (Johnson and 
Lys1990; Imhoff 2003). In this role, auditors provide investors and other potential users 
of financial statements with confidence in reported financial information audited by them. 																																																								
1 http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/270953.pdf 
2https://pcaobus.org/Registration/Firms/pages/registeredfirms.aspx	
3 Audit Analytics 
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However, although audits are expected to be a strong monitoring mechanism, not all 
audit firms have the same audit quality in term of level of knowledge and expertise, and 
auditor choice of clients’ firms varies based on audit quality (DeAngelo 1981).  
 
The extant literature indicates that auditor choice can be influenced by cultures, 
ownership structures, corporate governance, audit committee quality etc. (e.g., Abbott 
and Parker 2000; Hope et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2008; Guedhami et al. 2009; Ho and 
Kang 2013). Extending the literature, I assume that auditor choice can be impacted by 
stock liquidity. My argument is based on that stock liquidity is likely to influence 
companies’ decision making by facilitating incentives of institutional monitoring, either 
by enhancing blockholder voice (Maug1998) or by amplifying blockholder threat of exit 
(Edmans 2009; Edmans and Manso 2011).  
 
In addition, I also explore the association between stock liquidity and the level of audit 
fees. On one hand, stock liquidity strengthens the institutional monitoring, which lower 
information asymmetry between owners and managers, decrease the extent to which 
managers succeed in manipulation (Fang 2012), and thus reduce the demand for a more 
stringent audit process, and result in less audit fees. On the other hand, the enhanced 
governance appeal to high quality audits to mitigate agency costs and the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial reporting. In response to such clients’ demand, auditors increase their 
engagement efforts and charge higher audit fees. Therefore, based on the controversial 
argument above, the relationship between stock liquidity and audit fees is a matter of 
empirical interest. 
 
To address these objectives, I use Big 4 and industry expertise as the proxy for high 
quality of auditor, and use three measures for stock liquidity to analyze the response of 
companies’ auditor choice and audit fees to stock liquidity. Based on samples of U.S. 
firms for the period 2007–2014, I find that firms with more liquid stock are more likely to 
appoint high quality auditor, and pay more audit fees. To provide further evidences to 
these findings, I conduct some other additional tests. For example, I consider the effect of 
clients’ firm size on Big 4 choice, and divide the sample into quantiles by clients’ firm 
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size, and run the regression again. The result suggests that the role of stock liquidity on 
Big 4 choice is not driven by the client firm size. Next, since there are other definitions 
on industry expertise, I test the sensitivity of the prior results to the other measures of 
industry expertise, and it turns out that my findings are robust. I also investigate the 
possible impact of financial crisis on the results, since it documents that stock liquidity 
dries up in the financial crisis (NÆS et al. 2011). Through the analysis, I obtain the 
consistent results. Finally, while the primary tests are suggestive of a role for stock 
liquidity in auditor choice and audit fees, they are cross-sectional results, and thus suffer 
from endogeneity concerns. I implement a two-stage least squares estimation to address 
the endogeneity of stock liquidity, and the result indicate that the prior finding on the 
relationship between stock liquidity and auditor choice, and the relationship between 
stock liquidity and audit fees are persistent. 
 
This paper contributes to literature in several ways. First, it closes a gap and extends 
stock liquidity study into accounting.  It is a complement to the recent studies on the 
effects of stock liquidity under financial research. Second, it contributes to the auditor 
choice literature by suggesting that stock liquidity have significant influence on firms’ 
accounting properties through their impact on firms’ auditor choice. Third, although 
extensive empirical research documents the determinants of external audit fees in the 
audit market, this study is the first to investigate the relation between stock liquidity and 
audit fees. In addition, the study also contributes to the practice, since the findings have 
implications to the participants who concern about the concentration of audit market and 
the increasing audit fees in recent years. 
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The second section provides reviews of 
the literature on stock liquidity, the factors that influence auditor choice, the determinants 
of audit fees and thus gives the basis for our hypotheses. The third section describes the 
measures used for the dependent and control variables, the research design and the 
sample section procedure. The fourth section presents our empirical results. The fifth 
section provides the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this section, I develop two hypotheses. The first hypothesis examines how firms’ stock 
liquidity affects auditor choice of U.S. listed firms. The second hypothesis examines the 
relation between stock liquidity and audit fees. 
 
2.1 Stock Liquidity and Corporate Governance 
 
There is a long-standing debate as to whether stock liquidity enhances or weakens 
corporate governance. Studies that support enhanced effect are based on the argument 
that stock liquidity reinforces institutional monitoring in two ways. The first theory in this 
vein includes Maug (1998), Kahn and Winton (1998), and Noe (2002), which hold that 
stock liquidity help overcome the free-rider problem and strengthen the incentives of 
investors’ monitoring in the form of intervention in management decisions. To be detail, 
buying shares at a cost that does not fully reflect the value appreciation resulting from 
intervention encourage investors to overcome the free-riding problem. Trading profits are 
increasing with stock liquidity because liquidity makes informed trades to hide their 
purchases by pooling with noise traders. Therefore, once investors acquire large block of 
shares at favorable prices, they can benefit from price appreciation caused by their 
monitoring activities later (Kyle and Vila 1991; Maug 1998). In other words, investor 
monitor and trade with an aim to profit from their monitoring activities and stock 
liquidity facilitates to achieve their aim. Therefore, Maug (1998) concludes that liquid 
stock markets, far from being a hindrance to corporate control, tend to support effective 
corporate governance.  
 
Another causal mechanism through which stock liquidity may discipline management is 
identified in Palmiter (2002), Edmans (2009), and Admati and Pfleiderer (2009). They 
indicate if management’s compensation is tied to current stock prices, stock liquidity 
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increases the cost of managers’ opportunistic behavior by facilitating the informed 
selling, and the higher stock liquidity makes the threat of exit more credible. Since higher 
stock liquidity lowers transactions costs, even minor negative signals suffice to induce 
investors’ selling, which drives down the price of the targeted firms and compel manager 
to maximize shareholder wealth. In addition, Edmans and Manso (2011) exam the 
behavior of blockholders who are long-term institutions with the option to sell in the 
short run, and illustrate that their selling is more informative to other investors.  
 
Finally, to a certain extent, the theories on monitoring via intervention and monitoring via 
threat of exit are complementary to each other. For example, blockholders’ intervention 
in the U.S. is not ubiquitous, because they are always small and face obvious institutional 
and legal barriers. Sometimes, people suspect that intervention model can explain the role 
of such non-controlling shareholders playing in corporate governance. In this case, the 
exit model can be utilized to explain the monitoring capability from those multiple but 
small blockholders. In summary, when intervention models have difficulty, the exit 
model can justify why blockholders are so prevalent and exert governance even if they 
lack control rights (e.g., Edmans 2009; Edmans et al. 2013). 
 
While these two models focus on the positive role of stock liquidity in improving 
corporate governance, other researchers have noted potential adverse effects of market 
liquidity on agency problems within the company.  For example, Coffee (1991) and 
Bhide (1993) argue although liquidity is a lubricant for share purchase by investors, it 
makes blockholders’ position less firm, and facilitates the exit of current blockholders 
who are potential activists. Therefore, they insist that stock liquidity can be an 
impediment for shareholder to exert monitoring, and blockholers can more easily exit 
with little or no impact on price when confronted with a less negative signal.  
 
However, in this study, our argument bases on models that stock liquidity strengthens 
companies’ corporate governance, since they dominate in the literature and receives the 
support from empirical investigation. For example, as predicted by the exit model, Fang 
et al. (2009) finds evidence that liquidity enhances firm performance by increasing the 
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incentive effects of managerial pay-for performance contract. Norli (2014) indicates that 
stock liquidity increases the probability of activism and activists accumulate more stocks 
in targets when they are with more liquid stock. 
 
2.2 Stock Liquidity and Auditor Choice 
 
a. Stock Liquidity Mitigates High Quality Auditor Demand 
The separation of ownership and management in firms can result in severe agency 
problems in firms (Fama and Jensen1983a; Fama and Jensen1983b). Usually managers 
have more insider information than they provide to firms’ owner and have an incentive to 
bias the information to maximize their interest. On the other hand, firms’ owner is 
assumed be aware of managers’ incentive to exploit the information asymmetry, thus 
employed numerous tools to constrain such opportunistic actions on managers (Watts and 
Zimmerman1983). Audit is one of the tools available for owners to monitor management. 
Besides inspecting managers’ work, auditors also provide an independent check on the 
information provided by them to reinforce outsider users’ confidence in financial 
reporting as well as reduce the agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Johnson and 
Lys 1990; Imhoff 2003).  
 
However, the fact is that audit conducted does not necessarily eliminate all misbehaviors 
of managers, since not all audit firms have the same level of audit quality. As defined by 
DeAngelo (1981) and Copley and Douthett (2002), audit quality is the probability that an 
auditor discovers a breach in the accounting system, and reports the breach. Audit market 
is differentiated based on audit quality (Simunic 1980; Danos and Eichenseher 1986; 
Simunic and Stein 1987; Krishnan and Schauer 2000; Bruynseels et al. 2011), and a batch 
of studies explore the determinants of auditor choice in terms of audit quality. Among 
them, agency theory is used to explain the utility of external audit service (e.g., Watts and 
Zimmerman1983; Simunic and Stein1987; Wang et al.2008). To be specific, as agency 
conflicts between principal and agent increase, higher quality auditors are demand, 
because higher quality auditor is seen to provide greater assurance to reduce information 
asymmetry. For example, Guedhami (2009) indicate that foreign owners who are in 
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privatized firms that suffer more serious information asymmetry prefer higher quality 
auditors to ensure the reliability of financial statements to reduce agency costs. 
 
In this study, I investigate whether stock liquidity has any impact on companies’ auditor 
choice. As discussed, the demand for audit quality is driven by information asymmetry 
and conflict of interest between managers and investors (Watts and Zimmerman 1983; 
Healy and Palepu 2001). Companies with higher stock liquidity are subject to less severe 
agency problems, since as I mentioned, liquid stock can facilitate the formation of a 
toehold stake (Kyle and Vila, 1991), enhance the institutional monitoring, and improve 
corporate governance (Palmiter, 2002; Edmans, 2009; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009). All 
these lead to lower information asymmetry and less conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders, which mitigate the demand for the engagement of high 
quality auditors. In line with this argument, Ho and Kang (2013) and Khan et al. (2015) 
find that family firms are less likely to recruit top-tier auditors, since family owners exert 
influence to monitor their firms, resulting in less severe agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. In sum, I expect that firms have liquid stock have lower 
demand for high quality auditors to serve a monitoring function to alleviate agency 
problems between managers and shareholders.  
 
b. Stock Liquidity Enhances High Quality Auditor Demand  
Conversely, stock liquidity can enhance the demand of high quality auditor choice. The 
existing studies have demonstrated that high quality auditor translate into high earnings 
quality, and high quality auditors provide information with more integrity and reliability 
to investors and shareholders (e.g., Teoh and Wong1993; Becker et al. 1998). Investors 
also value firms that hire high quality auditors more than those that hire low quality 
auditors (Balvers et al. 1988; Copley and Douthett 2002; Krishnan 2003), since they gain 
access to information that is more useful. For example, Balsam et al. (2003) indicate that 
clients audited by high quality auditors have lower discretionary accruals and higher 
earnings response coefficients than clients audited by low quality auditors. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991), Pittman and Fortin (2004) and Krishnan et al. (2013) find that high 
quality of auditor reduces firms’ financing cost. 
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Although the benefit to recruit high quality auditor is obvious, managers avoid high 
quality auditor when they have incentive to exercise discretion over accounting policies 
or conceal their diversionary practices (Fan and Wong 2005; Guedhami et al.2009). Since 
high quality auditors are more independent and less influenced by external factors to 
issue modified audit opinions to firms with questionable accounting practices (DeFond et 
al. 2000, Chan et al.2006). High quality auditors also facilitate the flow of more credible 
firm-specific information into the stock market (Gul et al.2010). In this case, the 
appointment of high quality auditor could be imposed as a monitoring mechanism by 
shareholders (Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  
 
Given stock liquidity reinforcing companies’ corporate governance, I expect that stock 
liquidity could either directly (through the intervention) or indirectly (through selling and 
thereby driving down stock price) to impel management to provide better monitoring in 
the form of high quality auditors. This argument is consistent with findings in Kane and 
Velury (2004), that once shareholder, either as individually or as groups, have sufficient 
stock to be influential, they would apply sufficient force to obtain high quality auditor. 
Therefore, blockholders who are more sophisticated and hold proportionately larger 
block of share can be able to exert substantive influence and facilities firms to appoint 
high quality auditor, in the form of direct intervention or indirect threat of exit (Norli 
2014; Palmiter 2002; Edmans 2009; Edmans et al. 2013).   
 
Besides those, another stream of literature indicates that subjected to intense monitoring, 
managers have less opportunity and less temptation to engage in self-stealing activities. 
They are inclined to improve financial reporting to persuade outside investors that they 
are not extracting private benefit by appointing high quality auditors (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1983; Dyck and Zingales 2004; Barton 2005; Fang et.al 2016). Guedhami et 
al. (2014) find that connected insiders who refrain from self-dealing are more likely to 
appoint Big 4 auditor, since they have nothing to hide. Srinidhai (2014) also show that 
strongly governed family firms are more likely to choose higher quality audits to signal 
their transparency and signal their integrity by reporting higher earnings quality. 
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Therefore, given that stock liquidity is tend to enhance blockholders’ monitoring 
incentive, firm with higher stock liquidity, managers are more likely to hire higher 
quality auditors.  
 
c. Relationship Between Stock Liquidity and Auditor Choice  
In the light of discussion above, stock liquidity can either mitigate or enhance the demand 
for the high quality auditor. However, which force dominates the relationship between 
stock liquidity and auditor choice being a matter of empirical interest. Based on the 
controversial argument on the relationship between stock liquidity and auditor choice, my 
first hypothesis is a null hypothesis and stated in the following: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant relationship between stock liquidity and 
auditor choice.  
 
2.3 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees 
 
The second question that I investigate is the influence of stock liquidity on audit fees. I 
begin the argument with the controversial debate on the relationship between governance 
mechanism and the audit fee. On one hand, some studies (e.g., Carcello et al., 2002; 
Abbott et al., 2003) provide evidence to support that governance mechanisms require 
high quality auditors to mitigate agency costs and reduce the possibility of fraudulent 
financial reporting, and the engagement of high quality auditors lead to higher audit fees. 
This view names as demand-side perspective. On the other hand, other studies (e.g., Gul 
and Tsui, 1998) document that governance mechanisms mitigate agency conflicts in 
financial reporting and reduce the perceived risk of irregularities or accounting 
misstatements. The lower risk cuts down the scope of audit work, and decrease audit fees. 
This viewpoint names as supply-side (risk-based) perspective.  
 
a. Stock Liquidity Increases Audit Fees 
The argument in term of the association between stock liquidity and audit fees 
considering the effect of both supply and demand perspective. The analysis begins with 
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the demand-side perspective. Again, stock liquidity facilities the formation of 
blockholders, who are always sophisticated shareholders may require managers to utilize 
high quality auditors as a safeguard for the reliable financial reporting. In response to 
such clients’ demand, auditors increase their engagement efforts and charge higher audit 
fees. Therefore, from the demand-side perspective, stock liquidity is positively associated 
to audit fees. 
 
b. Stock Liquidity Decreases Audit Fees 
However, the relationship between stock liquidity and audit fees is also likely to hold 
from the supply-side risk perspective. Based on prior argument, stock liquidity enhances 
incentive of institutional monitoring over management, and improves corporate 
governance, which reduce managers’ flexibility to produce distorted financial statement 
information to benefit themselves. Consistent with this argument, Fang (2012) indicate 
that firms with relative higher stock liquidity have less positive accrual earning, lower 
accruals-based earnings management, future cash flows, and larger earnings response 
coefficients than firms with relative lower stock liquidity. Therefore, for clients with high 
liquid stock, auditors would perceive their audit risk to be lower, which result in lower 
engagement efforts and less risk premiums, thus less audit fees. Therefore, from the risk-
based supply perspective, there is a negative relationship between stock liquidity and 
audit fees. 
 
c. Relationship between stock liquidity and audit fees 
In the light of discussion above, it seems that audit fees are jointly determined by both the 
demand-related and supply-related perspectives. However, which factor dominates the 
relationship between stock liquidity and audit fees is a matter of empirical interest. Based 
on the controversial argument on the relationship between stock liquidity and audit fees, 
my second hypothesis is also a null hypothesis and stated in the following: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant relationship between stock liquidity and 
audit fees. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
3.1 Measures of Stock Liquidity 
 
I use three measures for stock liquidity. The first one is Turnover, which is defined as the 
log of the ratio of total shares traded annually divided by share outstanding. The higher 
turnover means the higher stock liquidity. I choose Turnover as one measure of stock 
liquidity, since it is the most natural measure and yields the sharpest empirical 
implications (Lo and Wang, 2000). Jayaraman and Milbourn (2012) also employ it as a 
proxy for stock liquidity, when investigating how stock liquidity influences the 
composition of CEO annual pay and the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price. 
They think that Turnover is a more feasible measure of stock liquidity, since this 
measure’s computation involves scaling shares traded by shares outstanding, and 
implicitly controls for firm size, so that enable the comparison across firms and over 
time. 
 
In addition, following Fang et al. (2009), I adopt other two measures: the Amihud (2002) 
measure of illiquidity and the percentage of zero-returns first used by Lesmond et al. 
(1999). Amihud (2002) develops a price impact measure to captures the “daily price 
response associated with one dollar of trading volume.” Specially, the ratio is: 
Illiquidity = Average (|rt|/Volumet) 
Where rt is the stock return on day t, and Volume is the dollar volume on day t. Since the 
ratio is undefined for zero-volume days, the average computes over all positive-volume 
days. Days with no trading are excluded from the calculation. To account for skewness in 
the distribution, the log-transforms is calculated in this study. Finally, because a higher 
value of this measure corresponds to a lower level of liquidity, I multiply it by -1 to 
facilitate interpretation as a measure of stock liquidity. 
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The last measure of stock liquidity is the proportion of days with zero returns, which is 
created in Lesmond et al. (1999). The reason to use it is that stocks with lower liquidity 
are more likely to have zero-volume days and thus are more likely to have zero-return 
days. The percentage of zero daily returns is calculated for each stock year, with zero 
daily returns and positive trading volume divided by the number of trading days over a 
firm's fiscal year. Consistent with prior literature, if the number of missing daily returns 
or zero daily returns in a firm-year exceeds 80% of the trading days for a firm’s fiscal 
year, the firm-year observations are dropped from my sample. Finally, the formula of the 
measure is 
Zeros= (# of positive-volume days with zero return)/T 
where T is the number of trading days over the fiscal year. Because a higher value of this 
measure corresponds to a lower level of liquidity, I also multiply it by -1 to facilitate 
interpretation as a measure of liquidity. 
 
3.2 Measures of Auditor Choice 
 
Audit quality is not directly observable. Several proxies are used to capture the quality 
association of audit services with auditor characteristic, like auditor size, industry 
expertise, auditor tenure, and the proportion of non-audit fees. Among them, I choose two 
alternatives as proxies for auditor choice in this study. The first one is Big 4, which 
captures the impact of stock liquidity on recruiting high quality auditor based on auditor 
size. It equals 1 for firms audited by one of Big 4 firms, and 0 otherwise. DeAngelo 
(1981), Rogerson et al. (1983) and Datar et al. (1991) think that larger and more 
prestigious auditors and audit firms have greater incentives to provide high quality 
auditors to protect their investment in reputational capital. Craswell et al. (1995) argue 
that, although all audit firms must comply with certain standards, larger audit firms are 
more likely to invest in higher levels of expertise. Francis (2004) conducts surveys and 
further support that Big 4 are brand-name suppliers of better assurance services to 
mitigate managers’ discretion over financial reporting, since Big 4 value their reputations 
and avoid liable for investor losses in civil litigation. In sum, Big 4, as a proxy for audit 
quality, received widely support in the academic research. 
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In addition, Hay (2013) call for alternative proxies to measure audit firm differentiation. 
To response such kind of appeal, I use the likelihood to recruit auditor with industry 
expertise as another proxy for audit choice. Industry specialist auditor variable is a 
dummy variable, which equals to 1 if the auditor is an industry specialist, and otherwise 
0. The measure of auditor industry expertise is based on audit firms’ market share in audit 
fees within industry groups classified by two-digit SIC codes (Hogan and Jeter 1999; 
Feguson et al. 2003). Therefore, an audit firm is defined as an industry expert if its 
market share is ranked number one at the national level (Reichelt et al. 2010; Krishnan et 
al. 2013).  
 
3.3 Empirical Models 
 
Following Fang et al. (2016), I use the following logistic model to test the role that stock 
liquidity plays in auditor choice.  
 
ACNit = a0 + a1* LiqNit + a2*SIZEit + a3*LEVit + a4*INVit + a5*ROAit+ a6*GROWTHit 
+ a7*LLOSSit + a8*SEGit + a9*CURRit+ a10*ATURNit+ a11*FOREIGNit 
+ Industry Fixed Effect + Year Fixed Effect + e                                               (1) 
 
Where ACN stands for the variable of auditor choice, and AC1 is Big 4 and AC2 is 
Industry Specialist respectively. so ACN equal to 1 if the auditor choice is either Big 4 or 
Industry Specialist. LiqN stands for three measures of stock liquidity and Liq1 is 
Turnover, Liq2 is Zeros multiplied by -1, and Liq3 is Illiquidity multiplied by -1 
respectively.  In line with the argument for Hypothesis 1, the coefficient for LiqN is 
uncertain, and the association between stock liquidity and auditor choice is under test. To 
isolate the role of stock liquidity, Equation (1) controls a branch of variables known to 
affect auditor choice (e.g., Mansi et al. 2004; Fan and Wong 2005; Lennox 2005; Fortin 
and Pittman2007; Choi and Wong 2007; Wang et al. 2008; Guedhami et al. 2009). It 
includes firm size (SIZE), computing as the natural logarithm of total assets, financial 
leverage (LEV), calculating as book value of total debt divided by the total assets, asset 
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structure (INV), capturing with the ratio of inventory to total assets, profitability (ROA), 
being the return on assets ratio, growth (GROWTH), amounting to the sales growth ratio 
in the past year, for prior year (LLOSS), being a dummy variable and equaling to 1 if the 
firm reports a negative income, and zero otherwise, segment (SEG), being the number of 
business segments based on two-digit SIC codes, current ratio (CURR), amounting to 
current asset divided by current liabilities, asset turnover (ATURN), calculating as net 
sales divided by total assets  and foreign operations (FOREIGN), equaling to 1 if the firm 
has foreign operations. I control SIZE, ROA, LLOSS, and ATURN to capture the impact of 
firm size and performance on auditor choice. I control LEV and CURR to capture the 
influence of financial solvency and liquidity risks on audit choice. Next, GROWTH is 
controlled for a firm’s capital needs to its demand for a high-quality auditor. FOREIGN 
and SEG control the complicacy of the auditor scope. Finally, I control the industry and 
year fixed effect. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix. 
Subsequently, based on previous research (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Hogan and Wilkins 
2008), I use the below equation to test Hypothesis 2 and investigate the relation between 
stock liquidity and audit fees. 
 
LAUDFit = b0 + b1*LiqNit + b2*BIG 4it + b3*SIZEit+b4*RECINVit + b5*LEVit+ b6*ROAit 
+ b7*GCit+ b8*MERGERit+b9*RESTRUCit + b10*SPECIALit+ b11*MBit  
+ b12*SEGit + b13*ROANEGit+ b14*FOREIGN15+Industry Fixed Effect  
+Year Fixed Effect + e                                                                                   (2) 
 
Where LAUDF is the dependent variable and calculated as the natural logarithm of audit 
fees. In line with the argument for Hypothesis 2, the coefficient for LiqN is uncertain, and 
the association between stock liquidity and audit fees is under test. Some control 
variables incorporated into Equation (2) are the same as in the Equation (1), including 
BIG 4, SIZE, LEV, ROA, SEG and FOREIGN. In addition, Equation (2) also includes 
some other variables, which are RECINV, being the sum of receivables and inventories 
scaled by assets, GC, coded 1 if the observation receives a going concern opinion, 
MERGER, coded 1 if the observation is engaged in a merger or acquisition, RESTRUC, 
equaling to 1 if the observation has a restructuring charge, SPECIAL, a dummy variable 
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again and coded to 1 if observation has the special items, MB, defined as total asset minus 
book value plus the market value of equity, then divided by total asset, and ROANEG, 
equaling to 1 if the firm’s ROA is negative; and 0 otherwise. Again, I control industry 
fixed effect and year fixed effect. The definitions of the variables are provided in 
Appendix as well. 
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The data for the primary empirical test comes from three sources. Firms’ financial 
information is from Compustat, data to compute the measure of stock liquidity is from 
CRSP, and date related to audit is from Audit Analytics. The sample period is from 2007 
to 2014. Excluding financial firms and utility firms, it includes 19868 firm-year 
observations with non-missing data for all variables for Equation (1), and it includes 
22250 firm-year observations with non-missing data for all variables for Equation (2). 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables for the full sample of firm-year 
observations used in Equation (1) and Equation (2). In Panel A, the overall mean of AC1 
is 0.770, which indicates that approximately 77% of observations hire BIG 4 to conduct 
audit in the sample, and the percentage of observations to hire Industry Specialist is 
0.240. Therefore, the two definitions of audit choice yield different samples, which avoid 
bias of sample composition in the study. In addition, Liq1, Liq2 and Liq3 are the 
measures of stock liquidity used in regression models of Equation (1) and Equation (2), 
and their mean values for the observation are -5.102, -0.025 and -0.648, respectively. 
 
In Panel B, it reports the pooled distribution of the firm-year regression regarding the 
impact of stock liquidity on audit fees. The mean of LAUDF is 13.892. Panel A and Panel 
B include some variables incorporated in both Equation (1) and Equation (2), like 
measures of audit choice, measures of stock liquidity, SIZE, ROA, LEV, SEG and 
FOREIGN, and their values in both Panels are comparable to each other. Besides, these 
variables as well as other control variables are qualitatively similar as the previous 
studies. Finally, to avoid outliers, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent 
and 99 percent levels. 
 
[Insert Table1 here] 
		 17	
 
Table 2 presents correlations among all the variables. Again, Panel A and Panel B 
describe the correlations among variables in the Equation (1) and Equation (2), 
respectively. In both panels, the correlation between AC1 and AC2 is positive and 
significant, the correlations among Liq1, Liq2 and Liq3 are positive and significant. In 
Panel A, the two measures of audit choice positively significantly correlate to Liq1, Liq2 
and Liq3. In other words, the stock liquidity enhances the choice of high quality auditors. 
In the Panel B, LAUDF is positively significantly correlated to Liq1, Liq2 and Liq3 
respectively as well.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.2 Univariat Analysis 
 
Table 3 shows the result of univariat analysis for subsamples consisting of observations 
audited by different type of auditors. There are Panel A, and Panel B, where AC1 and 
AC2 is used to measure auditor choice, respectively. This table presents the p-value from 
T-tests and Wilcoxon Z-tests for difference in means and medians between the two 
groups of observations.  
 
As noted in both panels, observations audited by Big4 or Industry Specialist have 
characteristics that are distinguished from those audited by Non-Big4 or Non-Industry 
Specialist. To be specific, stock liquidity from observations audited by high quality 
auditor is significantly greater than stock liquidity from those audited by low quality 
auditor. In other words, clients audited by relative higher quality auditors have higher 
stock liquidity. In addition, clients audited by higher quality auditors have significantly 
larger firm size, less financial leverage, more inventory, more profitability, lower growth 
rate, less financial loss, more foreign operations, more complex control, and lower 
current ratio and asset turnover.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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4.3 Multivariate Results for Auditor Choice 
 
Table 4 reveals the results of test for the relationship between stock liquidity and auditor 
choice. The t-values are clustered by firm (Rogers 1993). The results for three measures 
of stock liquidity are given in Column (1), Column (2) and Column (3), respectively. In 
Panel A, the proxy for the auditor choice is AC1, and when the measure of stock liquidity 
is Liq1, the coefficient of stock liquidity is 0.053 and significant at t-value of 9.71. When 
the measure of stock liquidity is Liq2 (Liq3), the coefficient of stock liquidity is 1.775 
(0.010) and significant at-value of 7.95 (7.89). Therefore, the result indicates that the 
higher liquid of firms’ stock, the high possibility of Big4 appointment.  
 
Panel B shows the results of test for the relationship between stock liquidity and choice 
for the industry specialist. In Panel B, when the measure of stock liquidity is Liq1, the 
coefficient of stock liquidity is 0.011 and significant at T-value of 2.01. When measure of 
stock liquidity is Liq2 (Liq3), the coefficient of stock liquidity is 0.375 (0.003) and 
significant at T-value of 2.31 (4.71). Therefore, firms with more liquid stock are inclined 
to hire industry specialist, supporting the claim that stock liquidity influences firms’ 
auditor choice by enhancing corporate governance. For the rest of control variables, their 
coefficients are consistent with prior studies. For example, larger firms, firms with higher 
leverage, or firms exhibiting serious financial loss are more likely to hire high quality 
auditors. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
4.4 Multivariate Results for Auditor Fees 
 
Table 5 gives the regression results for Equation (2) to test the relationship between stock 
liquidity and audit fees when Big4 is proxy for auditor choice. The t-values are clustered 
by firms (Rogers 1993) as well. Since the audit fees charged by Big4 is obviously 
different from Non-Big 4, the sample is partitioned into Big4 and Non-Big4. The results 
for the three measures of stock liquidity are given in Column (1), Column (2) and 
Column (3), respectively. Panel A is the result for firms audited by Big 4. From the Panel 
		 19	
A, I find that stock liquidity is significantly positively related to audit fees. To be 
specific, the coefficient of Liq1 is 0.050 and significant at t-value of 4.86. The coefficient 
of Liq2 (Liq3) is 0.369 (0.017), and the T-value is 1.10 (4.89). All these results indicate 
that audit fees are relatively higher in firms with more liquid stock. In addition, in Panel 
B, there is a similar result in the Non-Big 4 subsample as observed in Panel A. For the 
control variables, their coefficients are consistent with prior studies. For example, larger 
firms pay higher audit fees. Firms have more merger and acquisition activities, more 
foreign operations, and more business segments pay more audit fees, and auditors charge 
lower fees for firms with greater ROA. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 6 gives the regression results for Equation (2) to test the relationship between stock 
liquidity and audit fees when using industry specialist proxy for audit choice. The t-
values are clustered by firm (Rogers 1993) as well. The results for the three measures of 
stock liquidity are given in Column (1), Column (2) and Column (3) respectively. Panel 
A is the result for firms audited by Industry Specialist. From Panel A, I find that stock 
liquidity is significantly positively associated with audit fees when the measure of stock 
liquidity is Liq1 and Liq3. Panel B reports the result for firms audited by Non-Industry 
Specialist, and the results indicate a significantly positive association between stock 
liquidity and audit fees for all measures of stock liquidity.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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CHAPTER 5. ADDITIONAL TESTS 
 
5.1 Effect of Client Firm Size on Big4 Choice 
 
As illustrated in Table 1 Panel A, client firm size is significantly associated with the 
services’ provision of large audit firms, and 77% of large public firms saw their choice of 
auditor as limited to Big4. These motives me to further investigate whether client firm 
size drives the findings about the association between stock liquidity and auditor choice. 
To provide further evidence, I divided the sample into quantiles by client firm size, and 
re-run the regression for each quantile. The results of these regressions are presented in 
Table 7 panel A, Panel B and Panel C. The relation between stock liquidity and audit size 
is robust across the whole range of client firm size when the measure of stock liquidity is 
Liq1, and robust across the small and median of client firm size when the measure of 
stock liquidity is Liq2 and Liq3. Therefore, our prior results are not driven from clients 
with large firm size. In general, the result in Table 7 is consistent with our previous 
findings that stock liquidity is significantly associated with Big 4 auditor choice.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
5.2 Effect of Internal Control Weakness on Audit Fees 
 
Hogan and Wilkins (2008) find that audit fees are abnormally high for firms with an 
internal control weakness (ICW) in the year preceding ICW disclosure, since auditors is 
likely to exert more effort for the substantive tests to reduce the impact of poor internal 
controls. While the earlier research design in this study does not exclude the effect of 
ICW on audit fees. Therefore, to be sure that the results to Hypothesis 2 is also persistent 
after isolating the effect of ICW, I form a sample that only includes observations without 
occurrence of ICW, and apply this sample to the Equation (2). The results reported in 
Table 8 and Table 9 provide further evidence on the relation stock liquidity and audit 
fees. 
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[Insert Table 8 here] 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
5.3 Alterative Definitions of Specialist Auditor  
 
Besides the prior proxy of industry specialist employed in this study, the extant literature 
has used several other proxies to measure industry expertise. I adopt other two measures 
and re-run the regression to test the robustness of the results on auditor choice and audit 
fees. The first measurement of auditor industry expertise is still based on audit firms’ 
market share in audit fees within industry groups classified by two-digit SIC codes. The 
auditor is an industry specialist if the auditor has a market share greater than 30% in a 
two-digit SIC category in a particular year. I use Specialist1 to stand for it (Reichelt et al. 
2010; Krishnan et al. 2013). 
 
For the second measure, I follow Balsam et al. (2003), and define an auditor as specialist 
in an industry if the auditor has the greatest number of clients in the industry. I use 
Specialist2 to stand for it. Our analyses with these definitions yield results tabulated in 
Table 10 to Table 13, which are consistent with prior results reported in the Table 4, 
Table 5 and Table 6. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
 
5.4 Effect of Financial Crisis Period 
 
NÆS et al. (2011) find stock liquidity worsens the onset of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research recession periods, such as the recent 2008-2010 financial crisis 
period (Srinidhi et al.2014). Since the sample period for the previous analysis in this 
study covers 2008 and 2010, to test the robustness of the findings, I conduct a separate 
analysis for the 2008 and 2010 period, and tabulate the results in Table 14, Table 15 and 
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Table 16. Again, the results of the logit regression with respect to auditor choice in Panel 
A, Panel B and Panel C of Table 14 are consistent with the results reported earlier. The 
coefficient of three measures of stock liquidity are still positive and significant, providing 
additional evidence to support that firms with relatively high stock liquidity are more 
likely to hire high quality auditor.  
 
Regarding the test on the relationship between stock liquidity and audit fees, the results in 
the Panel B of Table 15 and Table 16 indicate that firms audited by Non-Big4 firm and 
Non-Industry Specialist have consistent results with the findings reported earlier. While 
in the Panel A of Table 15 and Table 16, when using the Liq3 as the proxy for stock 
liquidity, I find the consistent results with prior findings. In general, even during the 
financial crisis period, the results partially support that auditors are likely charge more 
audit fees for firms with higher liquid stock.  
 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
[Insert Table 16 here] 
 
5.5 Endogeneity Concerns 
 
While the above tests are suggestive of the role for stock liquidity in auditor choice and 
audit fees, they are cross-sectional in nature, and thus the reverse causality problem due 
to simultaneity between stock liquidity and auditor choice or between stock liquidity and 
audit fees could not excluded. In other words, liquidity may affect auditor choice, and 
auditor choice could also affect stock liquidity; liquidity may affect auditor fees, and 
auditor fees could also affect stock liquidity. For example, Lang et al. (2012) find that 
high-quality auditors are associated with high stock liquidity for which the proportion of 
zero-return trading days is used as proxy. Ascioglu et al. (2005) also indicate that the 
auditor compensation lowers market liquidity of firms with weak corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
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Therefore, I employ a two-stage-least square regression to address the endogeneity 
concerns on these results. Following Fang et al. (2009), lagged value of liquidity 
(LagLiq) and the median of stock liquidity for firms in the industry (IndLiq) are chose as 
instruments variables, since they are correlated with stock liquidity, but are unlikely to be 
correlated with the error term. To be specific, the use of lagged liquidity as an exogenous 
variable helps mitigate concerns that an unobservable is correlated with stock liquidity, 
auditor choice and audit fees in the same fiscal year t. Regarding to industry stock 
liquidity, Fang et al. (2009) point out that the portion of a firm’s liquidity that is 
correlated with the liquidity of its industry is less likely to be correlated with 
unobservable that affect the outcome variable, which are firms’ auditor choice and audit 
fees in this study.   
 
Table 17 presents results of this instrumental variables approach to test Hypothesis 1. The 
coefficients on LagLiq and IndLiq in the first stage regression in all three panels of Table 
17 are positive and significant, which indicate that the instruments are highly correlated 
with stock liquidity. The last three columns present the second stage regression 
regressing proxy of auditor choice on the predicted component of liquidity from the first 
stage. Consistent with our primary earlier results, the coefficients on PrLiq, which is the 
predicted value from first stage regression, are positive and significant in the regression 
when using LiqN as the measure of stock liquidity. Thus, the relation between auditor 
choice and stock liquidity is robust to controlling for endogeneity using a two-stage least 
squares specification. 
[Insert Table 17 here] 
 
The results of the instrumental variables approach testing Hypothesis 2 are reported in 
Table 18 and Table 19. Similarly, the coefficients on LagLiq and IndLiq in the first stage 
are positive and highly significant, suggesting that the instruments are highly correlated 
with stock liquidity. In the second stage of regression, I regress audit fees on the 
predicted component of liquidity from the first stage. Consistent with our primary prior 
results, the coefficient on PrLiq is positive and significant in the regression in all 
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samples. Thus, the relation between auditor fees and stock liquidity is robust to 
controlling for endogeneity using a two-stage least squares specification. 
[Insert Table 18 here] 
[Insert Table 19 here] 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION 	
In this paper, we examine the role of stock liquidity as institutional monitoring in 
influencing firms’ behavior by analyzing its effect on auditor choice and audit fees. It is 
motivated by the concern about the continued concentration of audit market from 
organizations, including SEC and PCAOB. Controlling for a large set of control variables 
and industry and year fixed effects, I find that more liquid firms are more likely to hire 
high quality auditor, and audit firms charge more for clients with more liquid stock. To 
further support these claims, I conduct a series of additional tests and find consistent 
results. For example, I use alternative measures of auditor choice to examine the 
sensitivity of prior results, use the separate sample to test the robustness of result during 
the period of financial crisis and use a two-stage least squares specification to mitigate 
concerns regarding endogeneity. Overall, the findings from this study may provide the 
implications to participants who are concern about the further concentration of the audit 
market and the increasing of audit fees in the U.S.  
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Table 1 Statistic Description for Regression Variables 
 
Panel A: Variables in Equation (1) 
    
Variables N Mean Median S.D. P25 P75 
AC1 19868 0.770 1.000 0.421 1.000 1.000 
AC2 19868 0.240 0.000 0.427 0.000 0.000 
Liq1 19868 (5.102) (4.996) 1.003 (5.637) (4.446) 
Liq2 19868 (0.025) (0.016) 0.029 (0.036) (0.005) 
Liq3 19868 (0.648) (0.008) 3.553 (0.041) (0.002) 
SIZE 19868 6.616 6.536 2.132 5.114 8.063 
LEV 19868 0.213 0.166 0.240 0.008 0.326 
INV 19868 0.104 0.064 0.121 0.005 0.158 
ROA 19868 (0.021) 0.036 0.318 (0.020) 0.077 
GROWTH 19868 0.146 0.059 0.667 (0.040) 0.181 
LLOSS 19868 0.302 0.000 0.459 0.000 1.000 
SEG 19868 1.943 2.000 0.767 1.414 2.449 
CURR 19868 2.878 2.047 3.058 1.338 3.278 
ATURN 19868 1.011 0.822 0.759 0.496 1.327 
FOREIGN 19868 0.414 0.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
 
  *All variables are defined in Appendix. 
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Panel B: Variables in Equation (2)       
Variables N Mean Median S.D. P25 P75 
LAUDF 22250 13.892 13.881 1.243 13.071 14.691 
Liq1 22250 (5.066) (4.968) 1.002 (5.588) (4.430) 
Liq2 22250 (0.024) (0.012) 0.028 (0.032) (0.004) 
Liq3 22250 (0.686) (0.008) 4.171 (0.041) (0.002) 
BIG4 22250 0.785 1.000 0.411 1.000 1.000 
Specialist 22250 0.247 0.000 0.431 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 22250 6.766 6.705 2.165 5.236 8.264 
RECINV 22250 0.232 0.200 0.178 0.083 0.335 
LEV 22250 0.217 0.177 0.231 0.012 0.336 
ROA 22250 (0.023) 0.036 0.304 (0.019) 0.077 
GC 22250 0.019 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.000 
MERGER 22250 0.247 0.000 0.431 0.000 0.000 
RESTRUC 22250 0.311 0.000 0.463 0.000 1.000 
SPECIAL 22250 0.988 1.000 0.110 1.000 1.000 
MB 22250 2.032 1.483 2.793 1.118 2.224 
SEG 22250 1.973 2.000 0.784 1.414 2.449 
ROANEG 22250 0.301 0.000 0.459 0.000 1.000 
FOREIGN 22250 0.420 0.000 0.494 0.000 1.000 
 
   * All variables are defined in Appendix. 
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Table 2 Pearson Correlation 
Panel A: Variables in Equation (1)                           
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1)AC1 1.00               
(2)AC2 0.19 1.00              
(3)Liq1 0.12 0.06 1.00             
(4)Liq2 0.22 0.10 0.32 1.00            
(5)Liq3 0.16 0.06 0.33 0.13 1.00           
(6)SIZE 0.65 0.30 0.32 0.49 0.22 1.00          
(7)LEV (0.18) (0.07) 0.02 0.03 0.01 (0.31) 1.00         
(8)INV (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) 0.04 (0.02) 1.00        
(9)ROA 0.26 0.10 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.47 (0.60) 0.07 1.00       
(10)GROWTH (0.07) (0.03) 0.06 0.02 0.03 (0.09) 0.00 (0.05) (0.02) 1.00      
(11)LLOSS (0.29) (0.13) (0.07) (0.30) (0.07) (0.50) 0.16 (0.13) (0.26) 0.05 1.00     
(12)SEG 0.31 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.07 0.50 (0.13) 0.11 0.19 (0.10) (0.27) 1.00    
(13)CURR (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.01) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) 0.09 0.02 0.11 (0.10) 1.00   
(14)ATURN (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) 0.04 0.02 0.44 0.07 (0.05) (0.21) 0.05 (0.21) 1.00  
(15)FOREIGN (0.04) (0.14) (0.01) 0.10 0.06 0.14 (0.08) (0.02) 0.07 (0.01) (0.01) 0.35 0.04 (0.10) 1.00 
 
*Coefficients in bold indicate significance at P<0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		 29	
 
*Coefficients in bold indicate significance at P<0.10 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Variables in Equation (2)                               
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1)LAUDF 1.00                  
(2)Liq1 0.02 1.00                 
(3)Liq2 0.19 0.32 1.00                
(4)Liq3 0.11 0.33 0.13 1.00               
(5)BIG 4 0.68 0.12 0.22 0.15 1.00              
(6)Specialist 0.33 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.19 1.00             
(7)Size 0.89 0.32 0.49 0.22 0.65 0.30 1.00            
(8)RECINV 0.03 (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.04) 0.01 1.00           
(9)LEV (0.24) 0.02 0.03 0.01 (0.18) (0.07) (0.31) (0.01) 1.00          
(10)ROA 0.36 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.26 0.10 0.47 0.07 (0.60) 1.00         
(11)GC (0.61) 0.12 0.04 0.02 (0.47) (0.25) (0.40) (0.05) 0.30 (0.36) 1.00        
(12)MERGER 0.29 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.18 (0.08) 0.23 0.01 (0.05) 0.08 (0.11) 1.00       
(13)RESTRUCR 0.43 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.26 (0.08) 0.33 0.10 (0.05) 0.10 (0.13) 0.27 1.00      
(14)SPECIAL 0.59 (0.08) 0.13 0.06 0.28 (0.37) 0.00 0.02 0.01 (0.02) (0.23) 0.26 0.32 1.00     
(15)MB (0.31) 0.02 0.03 0.02 (0.20) (0.08) (0.37) (0.07) 0.54 (0.69) 0.30 (0.06) (0.08) 0.00 1.00    
(16)SEG 0.55 0.08 0.18 0.07 0.31 0.14 0.50 0.17 (0.13) 0.19 (0.23) 0.20 0.36 0.00 (0.16) 1.00   
(17)ROANEG 0.06 (0.08) (0.14) (0.02) (0.01) (0.26) (0.49) (0.16) 0.16 (0.26) 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.54 0.15 (0.21) 1.00  
(18)FOREIGN 0.38 (0.01) 0.10 0.06 0.25 (0.14) 0.14 0.02 (0.08) 0.07 (0.16) 0.17 0.26 0.46 (0.07) 0.35 0.25 1.00 
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Table 3 Univariate Analysis 
 
Panel A: AC1 is the proxy for auditor choice         
  AC1=1 AC2=0     
Variables mean median mean median p-value Wilcoxon-p 
Liq1 (4.916) (4.855) (5.642) (5.631) 0.000 0.000 
Liq2 (0.020) (0.012) (0.044) (0.036) 0.000 0.000 
Liq3 (0.239) (0.005) (2.199) (0.071) 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 7.212 7.166 4.645 4.585 0.000 0.000 
LEV 0.233 0.197 0.163 0.076 0.000 0.000 
INV 0.094 0.053 0.128 0.082 0.000 0.000 
ROA (0.016) 0.037 (0.115) 0.016 0.000 0.000 
GROWTH 0.136 0.059 0.170 0.058 0.000 0.830 
LLOSS 0.285 0.000 0.430 1.000 0.000 0.000 
SEG 2.014 2.000 1.669 1.414 0.000 0.000 
CURR 2.765 1.960 3.780 2.419 0.000 0.000 
ATURN 0.947 0.760 1.075 0.924 0.000 0.000 
LAUDF 14.260 14.169 12.649 12.567 0.000 0.000 
MERGER 0.263 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RESTRUC 0.353 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SPECIAL 0.988 1.000 0.990 1.000 0.942  
MB 2.023 1.497 2.168 1.335 0.000 0.000 
ROANEG 0.285 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FOREIGN 0.447 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
*Statistical significance of the difference in the means and medians is based on a two-tailed test. 
P-value in bold indicate significance.  
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Panel B: AC2 is the proxy for auditor choice     
  AC2=1 AC2=0     
Variables mean median mean median p-Value Wilcoxon-p 
Liq1 (4.913) (4.869) (5.136) (5.030) 0.000 0.000 
Liq2 (0.019) (0.012) (0.027) (0.016) 0.000 0.000 
Liq3 (0.181) (0.004) (0.848) (0.011) 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 7.424 7.372 6.371 6.268 0.000 0.000 
LEV 0.238 0.212 0.210 0.158 0.000 0.000 
INV 0.098 0.056 0.103 0.060 0.005 0.142 
ROA (0.007) 0.037 (0.049) 0.032 0.000 0.000 
GROWTH 0.120 0.057 0.151 0.060 0.002 0.324 
LLOSS 0.273 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SEG 2.056 2.000 1.896 1.732 0.000 0.000 
CURR 2.575 1.869 3.132 2.107 0.000 0.000 
ATURN 0.959 0.773 0.982 0.798 0.026 0.075 
LAUDF 14.382 14.286 13.735 13.735 0.000 0.000 
MERGER 0.260 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RESTRUC 0.359 0.000 0.291 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SPECIAL 0.986 1.000 0.989 1.000 0.024  
MB 1.971 1.473 2.083 1.461 0.076 0.348 
ROANEG 0.273 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FOREIGN 0.442 0.000 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
*Statistical significance of the difference in the means and medians is based on a two-tailed test. 
P-value in bold indicate significance.  
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Table 4 Stock Liquidity and Auditor Choice 
 
Panel A: AC1 is the proxy for auditor choice  
Variables Liq1      Liq2             Liq3 
  Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.053 9.71*** 1.775 7.95*** 0.010 7.89*** 
SIZE 0.103 25.95*** 0.102 23.18*** 0.110 28.58*** 
LEV (0.002) (0.07) 0.004 0.54 (0.005) (0.22) 
INV (0.350) (4.84)*** (0.385) (4.15)*** (0.368) (5.10)*** 
ROA (0.060) (3.18)*** (0.074) (2.23)*** (0.069) (3.69)*** 
GROWTH (0.005) (1.12) (0.003) (0.04) (0.001) (0.29) 
LLOSS 0.030 2.81*** 0.050 5.11*** 0.035 3.31*** 
SEG (0.011) (1.30) (0.013) (0.30) (0.014) (1.57) 
CURR 0.002 1.00 0.002 0.40 0.003 1.37 
ATURN 0.010 0.93 0.010 0.15 0.012 1.10 
FOREIGN 0.048 4.06*** 0.048 1.85* 0.045 3.73*** 
INTERCEPT 0.374 7.97*** 0.154 5.40*** 0.062 1.87* 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
observations 19868  19868  19868  
Adj. R2 31.8%  31.5%  31.2%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: AC2 is the proxy for audit choice   
Variables             Liq1    Liq2  Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.011 2.01** 0.375 2.31** 0.003 4.71*** 
SIZE 0.046 12.04*** 0.046 11.65*** 0.047 13.05*** 
LEV (0.027) (1.21) (0.026) (1.16) (0.028) (1.23) 
INV (0.051) (0.85) (0.058) (0.98) (0.051) (0.86) 
ROA (0.025) (2.13)** (0.028) (2.36)*** (0.026) (2.25)** 
GROWTH (0.005) (1.13) (0.004) (1.07) (0.004) (0.99) 
LLOSS 0.023 2.28** 0.027 2.71*** 0.024 2.39*** 
SEG 0.003 0.30 0.002 0.25 0.002 0.26 
CURR (0.001) (1.06) (0.001) (0.94) (0.001) (0.97) 
ATURN 0.014 1.55 0.014 1.56 0.014 1.60 
FOREIGN 0.004 0.33 0.004 0.34 0.003 0.25 
INTERCEPT (0.024) (0.53) (0.067) (2.13)** (0.084) (2.98)*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 19868  19868  19868  
Adj. R2 6.5%  4.6%  6.5%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 5 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees (AC1) 
 
Panel A: AC1 is the measure of audit choice, and AC1=1     
Variable     Liq1        Liq2         Liq3   
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.050  4.86***  0.369 1.10  0.017 4.89***  
SIZE 0.470  47.63***  0.476 48.91***  0.475 40.91***  
RECINV 0.696  9.09***  0.669 8.69***  0.681 8.94***  
LEV 0.036  1.01  0.033 0.93  0.032 0.91  
ROA (0.195)  (6.55)***  (0.197) (6.50)***  (0.195) (6.47)***  
GC 0.147  3.54***  0.160 3.70***  0.153 3.55***  
MERGER 0.071  4.95***  0.069 4.83***  0.070 4.86***  
RESTRUC 0.198  12.57***  0.200 12.58***  0.197 12.50***  
SPECIAL (0.056)  (1.10)  (0.054) (1.08)  (0.051) (1.02)  
MB 0.005  1.44  0.006 1.41  0.006 1.41  
SEG 0.136  9.79***  0.132 9.49***  0.134 9.65***  
ROANEG 0.113  7.15***  0.120 7.42***  0.118 7.38***  
FOREIGN 0.028  1.51 0.025 1.33 0.024 1.27  
INTERCEPT 11.010  62.52*** 10.736 62.64*** 10.739 65.35***  
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 17172  17172  17172  
Adj. R2 79.12%   78.97%   79.05%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: AC1 is the measure of audit choice, and AC1=0 
 
Variables Liq1   Liq2   Liq3   
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.062  4.61***  1.142 3.03*** 0.005  3.06*** 
SIZE 0.465  33.08***  0.468 32.86*** 0.475  34.26  
RECINV 0.185  2.12**  0.158 1.81* 0.163  1.87* 
LEV 0.017  0.31  0.000 0.01  (0.003)  (0.05)  
ROA (0.176)  (5.36)***  (0.184) (5.74)*** (0.185)  (5.65)*** 
GC 0.113  1.98*  0.132 2.31* 0.129  2.24** 
MERGER 0.066  2.36***  0.072 2.53** 0.070  2.46*** 
RESTRUC 0.159  5.48***  0.160 5.48*** 0.159  5.41*** 
SPECIAL 0.104  1.17  0.124 1.36  0.115  1.26  
MB (0.010)  (4.52)  (0.010) (4.90)*** (0.010)  (4.48)*** 
SEG 0.165  6.37***  0.161 6.24*** 0.162  6.22*** 
ROANEG 0.110  4.14***  0.123 4.57*** 0.114  4.24*** 
FOREIGN 0.127  3.50*** 0.131 3.57*** 0.130  3.53*** 
INTERCEPT 9.820  42.81*** 9.487 48.87*** 9.419  48.08*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 5078  5078  5078  
Adj. R2 71.12%   70.83%   70.77%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 6 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees (AC2) 
 
Panel A: AC2 the measure of audit choice, and AC2 =1       
 
Variables Liq1   Liq2   Liq3   
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.052  3.11*** 0.685 1.37 0.019 2.92*** 
BIG4 0.386 1.71* 0.419 1.93* 0.439 2.04* 
SIZE 0.488  49.39*** 0.492 49.18*** 0.493 51.09*** 
RECINV 0.759  7.14*** 0.747 6.95*** 0.755 7.13*** 
LEV 0.030  0.60  0.023 0.46 0.020 0.41  
ROA (0.327)  (7.12)*** (0.334) (7.27)*** (0.339) (7.46)*** 
GC 0.141  2.15** 0.151 2.25*** 0.145 2.18** 
MERGER 0.062  2.68*** 0.059 2.57*** 0.060 2.59*** 
RESTRUC 0.199  8.51*** 0.202 8.66*** 0.201 8.62*** 
SPECIAL (0.059)  (0.67)  (0.056) (0.66) (0.053) (0.61)  
MB 0.022  2.77*** 0.024 2.92*** 0.026 3.17*** 
SEG 0.138  6.55*** 0.135 6.37*** 0.137 6.46*** 
ROANEG 0.077  2.83  0.087 3.16*** 0.081 2.98*** 
FOREIGN 0.058  2.00* 0.055 1.89* 0.054 1.86* 
INTERCEPT 10.450  35.55*** 10.187 37.25*** 10.251 37.72*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 5400  5400  5400  
Adj. R2 82.15%   82.02%  82.06%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: AC2 is the measure of audit choice, and AC2 =0  
Variables Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
  Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.058 6.64*** 0.920 3.28*** 0.007 5.98*** 
BIG4 0.379 16.76*** 0.390 17.18*** 0.390 17.22*** 
SIZE 0.459 65.80*** 0.463 66.30*** 0.467 69.05*** 
RECINV 0.429 6.90*** 0.396 6.37*** 0.407 6.61*** 
LEV 0.011 0.35 0.006 0.19 0.005 0.16 
ROA (0.152) (6.22)*** (0.156) (6.43)*** (0.130) (6.34)*** 
GC 0.128 3.33*** 0.149 3.76*** 0.141 3.57*** 
MERGER 0.078 5.34*** 0.076 5.21*** 0.077 5.29*** 
RESTRUC 0.202 12.89*** 0.204 12.95*** 0.201 12.81*** 
SPECIAL (0.014) (0.31) (0.008) (0.18) (0.009) (0.18) 
MB (0.005) (1.47) (0.006) (1.49) (0.005) (1.37) 
SEG 0.142 10.49*** 0.138 10.19*** 0.139 10.25*** 
ROANEG 0.121 8.04*** 0.133 8.66*** 0.126 8.26*** 
FOREIGN 0.055 3.03*** 0.055 2.97*** 0.052 2.86*** 
INTERCEPT 10.475 61.42*** 10.164 63.76*** 10.124 63.63*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 16850  16850  16850  
Adj. R2 82.08%  82.08%  82.11%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 7 Stock Liquidity and Big 4 Auditor Choice (Effect of Client Firm Size) 
 
Panel A: Liq1 is the measure of stock liquidity     
Variables Q1: Small Size Q2: Median Size Q3: Large Size 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.042 4.45*** 0.025 2.50*** 0.006 1.66* 
SIZE 0.186 14.17*** 0.120 7.41*** 0.008 2.48*** 
LEV (0.076) (2.00)** (0.031) (0.93) 0.027 1.32 
INV (0.456) (4.51)*** (0.173) (1.41) 0.088 1.34 
ROA (0.119) (4.55)*** (0.118) (1.99)* (0.005) (0.19) 
GROWTH (0.002) (0.26) (0.022) (2.11)** (0.018) (2.05)** 
LLOSS 0.105 5.48*** 0.002 0.10 (0.018) (2.11)** 
SEG 0.017 0.82 (0.017) (1.18) (0.001) (0.18) 
CURR 0.002 1.17 0.002 0.63 (0.001) (0.34) 
ATURN 0.010 0.59 0.029 1.65* 0.002 0.21 
FOREIGN 0.087 3.47*** 0.024 1.29 0.003 0.38 
INTERCEPT -0.174 (0.78) 0.080 0.35 0.948 18.84*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Observations 6627  6622  6619  
Adj. R2 26.2%  10.8%  4.6%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: Liq2 is the measure of stock liquidity 
Variables Q1: Small Size Q2: Median Size Q3: Large Size 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 1.025 3.57*** 0.796 2.24** 0.123 0.63 
SIZE 0.116 11.58*** 0.090 6.69*** 0.007 2.08** 
LEV (0.051) (1.25) (0.009) (0.27) 0.026 1.27 
INV (0.730) (7.26)*** (0.009) (2.02)** 0.078 1.20 
ROA (0.098) (3.72)*** (0.181) (2.85)*** (0.007) (0.31) 
GROWTH (0.003) (0.54) (0.012) (1.11) (0.017) (1.98)* 
LLOSS 0.129 6.68*** 0.007 0.41 (0.019) (1.86)* 
SEG 0.014 0.66 (0.019) (1.33) (0.001) (0.20) 
CURR 0.008 3.24*** 0.005 1.36 (0.001) (0.34) 
ATURN 0.008 (5.81)*** (0.045) (2.27)** (0.004) (0.50) 
FOREIGN 0.101 3.94*** 0.027 1.46 0.003 0.36 
INTERCEPT 0.113 0.52 0.248 0.25 0.942 23.13*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 6627  6622  6619  
Adj. R2 22.4%  9.8%  4.3%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel C: Liq3 is the measure of stock liquidity 
Variables Q1: Small Size Q2: Median Size Q3: Large Size 
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
Liq3 0.003 2.54*** 0.015 2.31** (0.001) (0.69) 
SIZE 0.194 14.96*** 0.126 8.05*** 0.009 2.59*** 
LEV (0.084) (2.21)** (0.037) (1.11) 0.027 1.33 
INV (0.493) (4.87)*** (0.180) (1.47) 0.087 1.32 
ROA (0.130) (4.93)*** (0.120) (2.01)** (0.006) (0.23) 
GROWTH 0.001 0.24 (0.018) (1.74)* (0.017) (2.05)** 
LLOSS 0.107 5.55*** 0.003 0.16 (0.020) (1.91)* 
SEG 0.015 0.72 (0.018) (1.28) (0.001) (0.27) 
CURR 0.003 1.27 0.003 0.83 (0.001) (0.22) 
ATURN 0.010 0.57 0.029 1.64* 0.002 0.30 
FOREIGN 0.087 3.43*** 0.021 1.12 0.003 0.34 
INTERCEPT (0.439) (2.02)** (0.087) (0.41) 0.917 21.90*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 6627  6622  6619  
Adj. R2 25.7%  10.7%  4.4%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 8 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees (AC1 and No ICW) 
 
Panel A: AC1 is the measure for audit choice, firms are audited by Big4 and no 
ICW   
 
Variables     Liq1    Liq2         Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.049 4.86*** 0.304 0.90 0.017 4.82*** 
SIZE 0.472 47.63*** 0.478 48.83*** 0.477 40.79*** 
RECINV 0.688 8.94*** 0.661 8.55*** 0.674 8.81*** 
LEV 0.040 1.12 0.037 1.05 0.036 1.02 
ROA (0.200) (6.43)*** (0.201) (6.38)*** (0.200) (6.36)*** 
GC 0.122 2.93** 0.133 3.09*** 0.126 2.94** 
MERGER 0.069 4.80*** 0.067 4.68*** 0.068 4.70*** 
RESTRUC 0.194 12.45*** 0.196 12.46*** 0.193 12.39*** 
SPECIAL (0.047) (0.93) (0.044) (0.90) (0.042) (0.84) 
MB 0.006 1.45 0.007 1.41 0.007 1.42 
SEG 0.134 9.59*** 0.130 9.29*** 0.132 9.44*** 
ROANEG 0.108 6.73*** 0.114 6.95*** 0.113 6.94*** 
FOREIGN 0.024 1.29 0.021 1.10 0.020 1.05 
INTERCEPT 10.978 56.83*** 10.699 55.01*** 10.706 57.67*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Observations 16630  16630  16630  
Adj. R2 79.70%  79.56%  79.63%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: AC1 is the measure for audit choice, and firms are audited by non-Big4 and no ICW 
Variables Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.063 4.76*** 1.106 2.95** 0.004 2.87** 
SIZE 0.465 32.94*** 0.468 32.73*** 0.475 34.13*** 
RECINV 0.185 2.09** 0.153 1.75* 0.158 1.81* 
LEV 0.016 0.29 (0.001) (0.02) (0.005) (0.09) 
ROA (0.192) (6.46)*** (0.199) (6.72)*** (0.201) (6.84)*** 
GC 0.099 1.72* 0.120 2.06** 0.116 1.99* 
MERGER 0.065 2.28** 0.071 2.45*** 0.069 2.38** 
RESTRUC 0.155 5.38*** 0.156 5.37*** 0.155 5.32*** 
SPECIAL 0.107 1.19 0.125 1.36 0.117 1.27 
MB (0.011) (5.59)*** (0.011) (5.89)*** (0.011) (5.57)*** 
SEG 0.164 6.32*** 0.160 6.17*** 0.160 6.15*** 
ROANEG 0.107 4.09*** 0.119 4.49*** 0.111 4.17*** 
FOREIGN 0.124 3.46*** 0.128 3.54*** 0.127 3.51*** 
INTERCEPT 9.831 42.76*** 9.488 48.65*** 9.421 47.95*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Observations 4920  4920  4920  
Adj. R2 71.41%  71.08%  71.03%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 9 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees (AC2 and No ICW) 
 
Panel A: AC2 is the measure for audit choice, firms are audited by Industry Specialist and no 
ICW 
Variables             Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.052 3.08*** 0.726 1.42 0.023 3.03*** 
BIG4 0.399 1.76* 0.432 1.98* 0.453 2.09* 
SIZE 0.487 39.18*** 0.491 29.00*** 0.492 20.98*** 
RECINV 0.750 6.99*** 0.738 6.81*** 0.748 7.01*** 
LEV 0.035 0.72 0.029 0.59 0.024 0.50 
ROA -0.324 (0.32) -0.333 (7.66)*** -0.338 (7.89)*** 
GC 0.121 0.06 0.131 1.96* 0.123 1.87* 
MERGER 0.055 2.36*** 0.052 2.25** 0.052 2.26** 
RESTRUC 0.206 8.83*** 0.209 8.99*** 0.208 8.98*** 
SPECIAL -0.051 (0.62) -0.050 (0.61) -0.046 (0.56) 
MB 0.024 3.02*** 0.027 3.15*** 0.028 3.44*** 
SEG 0.137 6.44*** 0.134 6.25*** 0.136 6.36*** 
ROANEG 0.073 2.83*** 0.082 2.94** 0.077 2.76*** 
FOREIGN 0.054 1.87* 0.051 1.77* 0.051 1.76* 
INTERCEPT 10.449 35.47*** 10.179 37.23*** 10.119 37.75*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 5212  5212  5212  
Adj. R2 82.48%  82.36%  82.40%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: AC2 is the measure for audit choice, and firms are audited by Non-Industry 
Specialist and no ICW 
Variables Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.057 6.62*** 0.837 2.99*** 0.008 5.69*** 
BIG4 0.372 16.47*** 0.384 16.91*** 0.384 16.96 
SIZE 0.502 47.30*** 0.508 47.51*** 0.513 52.79*** 
RECINV 0.302 4.62*** 0.254 3.88*** 0.271 4.13*** 
LEV 0.009 0.26 0.004 0.12 0.001 0.02 
ROA (0.170) (6.60)*** (0.176) (6.71)*** (0.172) (6.75)*** 
GC 0.097 2.32*** 0.124 2.88*** 0.113 2.63*** 
MERGER 0.078 5.20*** 0.076 4.98*** 0.078 5.10*** 
RESTRUC 0.215 13.60*** 0.219 13.77*** 0.214 13.55*** 
SPECIAL 0.005 0.10 0.014 0.28 0.014 0.27 
MB (0.005) (1.19) (0.005) (1.21) (0.005) (1.06) 
SEG 0.134 9.69*** 0.129 9.27*** 0.130 9.34*** 
ROANEG 0.127 7.94*** 0.143 8.79*** 0.133 8.22*** 
FOREIGN 0.072 3.86*** 0.072 3.82*** 0.069 3.66*** 
INTERCEPT 10.407 56.73*** 10.083 59.06*** 10.050 58.53*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 16338  16338  16338  
Adj. R2 82.88%  82.64%  82.68%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 10 Stock Liquidity and Specialist1 Choice 
 
 
Variables        Liq1     Liq2  Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.010 1.92* 0.506 3.16*** 0.003 4.38*** 
SIZE 0.048 12.24*** 0.046 11.53*** 0.049 13.18*** 
LEV (0.039) (1.77)* (0.037) (1.67)* (0.040) (1.78)* 
INV (0.061) (1.00) (0.066) (1.09) (0.061) (0.99) 
ROA (0.029) (2.34)** (0.032) (2.53)*** (0.030) (2.43)*** 
GROWTH (0.006) (1.47) (0.006) (1.50) (0.005) (1.34) 
LLOSS 0.024 2.37*** 0.029 2.92*** 0.025 2.48*** 
SEG 0.006 0.71 0.006 0.68 0.006 0.68 
CURR (0.002) (1.66)* (0.002) (1.56) (0.002) (1.57) 
ATURN 0.014 1.60 0.013 1.60 0.014 1.65* 
FOREIGN 0.004 0.35 0.004 0.38 0.003 0.27 
INTERCEPT (0.047) (1.06) (0.077) (2.44)*** (0.103) (3.60)*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 19868  19868  19868  
Adj. R2 13.8%  13.8%  13.8%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 11 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees (Specialist1) 
 
Panel A: Specialist1 is the measure for audit choice, and firms 
audited by Industry Specialist       
Variables Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.053 2.89*** 0.595 1.05 0.022 3.26*** 
BIG4 0.310 1.47 0.346 1.72* 0.362 1.82* 
SIZE 0.491 49.22*** 0.495 47.80*** 0.496 50.51*** 
RECINV 0.761 6.74*** 0.749 6.57*** 0.759 6.73*** 
LEV 0.082 1.62 0.078 1.54 0.075 1.49 
ROA (0.322) (6.29)*** (0.330) (6.45)*** (0.335) (6.60)*** 
GC 0.182 2.75 *** 0.191 2.73*** 0.188 2.72*** 
MERGER 0.059 2.44 *** 0.057 2.36*** 0.058 2.37*** 
RESTRUC 0.192 8.23*** 0.196 8.38*** 0.194 8.35*** 
SPECIAL (0.065) (0.73) (0.060) (0.69) (0.058) (0.66) 
MB 0.012 1.35 0.014 1.46 0.015 1.64* 
SEG 0.015 7.14*** 0.152 7.02*** 0.154 7.12*** 
ROANEG 0.071 2.40** 0.079 2.66** 0.075 2.52*** 
FOREIGN 0.031 1.01 0.027 0.88 0.027 0.88 
INTERCEPT 10.460 35.50*** 10.174 37.58*** 10.130 38.67*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 5255  5255  5255  
Adj. R2 82.75%  82.63%  82.67%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: Specialist1 is the measure for audit choice, and firms audited by Non-Industry 
Specialist 
Variables Liq1   Liq2   Liq3   
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.059  7.01***  0.938  3.38***  0.009  6.00***  
BIG4 0.375 16.48*** 0.387 16.90*** 0.386 16.91*** 
SIZE 0.457  63.95***  0.462  64.78***  0.465  66.98**  
RECINV 0.430  6.95***  0.396  6.40***  0.409  6.61***  
LEV 0.006  0.18  (0.006)  (0.02)  (0.001)  (0.04)  
ROA (0.149)  (6.19)***  (0.153)  (6.41)***  (0.150)  (6.30)***  
GC 0.122  3.07***  0.143  3.53***  0.135  3.33*** 
MERGER 0.079  5.44***  0.078  5.29***  0.079  5.39***  
RESTRUC 0.203  12.79***  0.205  12.84***  0.202  12.68***  
SPECIAL (0.008)  (0.17)  (0.003)  (0.05)  (0.002) (0.05)  
MB (0.005)  (1.38)  (0.005)  (1.38)  (0.005)  (1.25)  
SEG 0.136  9.81***  0.131  9.49***  0.132  9.56*** 
ROANEG 0.126  8.26***  0.137  8.89***  0.131  8.52***  
FOREIGN 0.064  3.51*** 0.064  3.44***  0.061  3.32***  
INTERCEPT 10.524  62.31*** 10.200  64.62*** 10.161  64.49***  
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 16995  16995  16995  
Adj. R2 82.02%   81.77%   81.81%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 12 Stock Liquidity and Specialist2 Choice 
 
 
Variable Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
  Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.023 3.78*** 0.789 4.15*** 0.003 3.43*** 
SIZE 0.038 8.72*** 0.037 8.39*** 0.042 10.07*** 
LEV (0.071) (2.82)*** (0.068) (2.70)*** (0.073) (2.88)*** 
INV (0.206) (2.70)*** (0.221) (2.90)*** (0.218) (2.85)*** 
ROA (0.042) (2.44)*** (0.048) (2.71)*** (0.046) (2.65)*** 
GROWTH 0.006 1.07 0.006 1.26 0.007 1.44 
LLOSS 0.022 1.96* 0.031 2.72*** 0.024 2.14** 
SEG (0.031) (3.13)*** (0.032) (3.21)*** (0.032) (3.25)*** 
CURR 0.003 1.46 0.003 1.56 0.003 1.63 
ATURN (0.006) (0.58) (0.006) (0.57) (0.006) (0.52) 
FOREIGN 0.003 0.21 0.003 0.21 0.002 0.12 
INTERCEPT 0.237 4.55*** 3.990 3.99*** 0.100 3.09*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of Observations 19868  19868  19868  
Adj. R2 5.1%  5.1%  4.9%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 13 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees (Specialist2) 
 
Panel A: Specialist2 is the measure for audit choice, and firms audited 
by Industry Specialist     
Variables Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.060 4.16*** 0.541 1.02 0.022 4.47*** 
BIG4 0.194 1.12 0.161 0.88 0.165 0.90 
SIZE 0.469 44.75*** 0.475 44.89*** 0.474 46.99*** 
RECINV 0.720 6.34*** 0.700 6.14*** 0.718 6.48*** 
LEV (0.033) (0.60) (0.038) (0.69) (0.036) (0.67) 
ROA (0.211) (3.74)*** (0.211) (3.75)*** (0.207) (3.71)*** 
GC 0.188 2.55*** 0.202 2.58*** 0.196 2.52*** 
MERGER 0.064 2.87*** 0.064 2.86 0.061 2.75 *** 
RESTRUC 0.206 8.81*** 0.211 8.97*** 0.207 8.89*** 
SPECIAL (0.068) (0.87) (0.070) (0.90) (0.067) (0.86) 
MB 0.011 1.62 0.014 1.89* 0.014 1.97* 
SEG 0.137 6.69*** 0.129 6.26*** 0.133 6.43*** 
ROANEG 0.126 4.52*** 0.136 4.82*** 0.133 4.72*** 
FOREIGN 0.016 0.56 0.014 0.43 0.009 0.31 
INTERCEPT 10.731 44.15*** 10.471 42.80*** 10.474 44.00*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 6430  6430  6430  
Adj. R2 78.82%  78.60%  78.75%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: Specialist2 is the measure for audit choice, and firms audited by Non-Industry 
Specialist 
Variables Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
  Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.052 5.72*** 0.881 3.06*** 0.007 5.10*** 
BIG4 0.378 16.32*** 0.388 16.71*** 0.388 16.74*** 
SIZE 0.465 65.37*** 0.469 66.10*** 0.472 67.83*** 
RECINV 0.414 6.52*** 0.385 6.09*** 0.396 6.24*** 
LEV 0.033 0.98 0.028 0.82 0.026 0.77 
ROA (0.154) (5.96)*** (0.159) (6.13)*** (0.156) (6.08)*** 
GC 0.126 3.17*** 0.144 3.57*** 0.137 3.40*** 
MERGER 0.079 5.32*** 0.077 5.14*** 0.078 5.24*** 
RESTRUC 0.198 12.05*** 0.200 12.07*** 0.197 11.96*** 
SPECIAL (0.002) (0.03) 0.005 0.09 0.006 0.11 
MB (0.006) (1.54) (0.006) (1.57) (0.005) (1.46) 
SEG 0.146 10.20*** 0.144 10.06*** 0.144 10.09** 
ROANEG 0.121 7.17*** 0.123 7.77*** 0.116 7.39*** 
FOREIGN 0.072 3.81*** 0.072 3.77*** 0.070 3.69*** 
INTERCEPT 10.437 60.07*** 10.157 61.98*** 10.118 61.80*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 15820  15820  15820  
Adj. R2 83.85%  83.67%  83.68%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 14 Stock Liquidity and Auditor Choice during Financial Crisis Period 
 
Panel A: AC1 is the measure for auditor choice 
Variables Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.062 9.15*** 1.911 6.76*** 0.008 5.92*** 
SIZE 0.101 22.31*** 0.102 22.03*** 0.113 26.20*** 
LEV 0.000 (0.01) 0.006 0.23 (0.003) (0.11) 
INV (0.393) (4.90)*** (0.427) (5.35)*** (0.416) (5.20)*** 
ROA (0.055) (2.54)*** (0.065) (2.91)** (0.063) (2.97)*** 
GROWTH (0.009) (1.20) (0.004) (0.55) (0.004) (0.52) 
LLOSS 0.048 3.59*** 0.064 4.84*** 0.049 3.66*** 
SEG (0.012) (1.19) (0.014) (1.39) (0.015) (1.52) 
CURR 0.001 0.23 0.001 0.47 0.001 0.52 
ATURN 0.012 1.00 0.014 1.17 0.013 1.13 
FOREIGN 0.042 2.96*** 0.040 2.87*** 0.038 2.67*** 
INTERCEPT 0.440 7.80*** 0.168 4.01*** 0.063 1.65* 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 8011  8011  8011  
Adj. R2 33.2%  32.1%  31.5%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
		 52	
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: AC2 is the measure for auditor choice   
Variables Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
  Coef. t-value Coef t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.010 1.50 0.465 2.19** 0.003 4.21*** 
SIZE 0.045 9.07*** 0.044 8.73*** 0.046 10.17*** 
LEV (0.028) (1.01) (0.026) (0.94) (0.027) (1.01) 
INV (0.050) (0.70) (0.054) (0.76) (0.048) (0.68) 
ROA (0.023) (1.63) (0.025) (1.75)* (0.024) (1.70)* 
GROWTH (0.016) (2.27)*** (0.015) (2.18)** (0.015) (2.20)** 
LLOSS 0.033 2.44*** 0.037 2.75*** 0.033 2.47*** 
SEG (0.005) (0.45) (0.005) (0.45) (0.005) (0.47) 
CURR (0.003) (1.38) (0.002) (1.34) (0.002) (1.32) 
ATURN 0.023 1.90* 0.024 1.93* 0.024 1.93* 
FOREIGN (0.001) (0.04) (0.001) (0.06) (0.002) (0.11) 
INTERCEPT (0.009) (0.16) (0.045) (1.12) (0.068) (1.91)* 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 8011  8011  8011  
Adj. R2 6.4%  6.4%  6.4%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 15 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees during Financial Crisis Period (AC1) 
 
Panel A: AC1 is the measure for audit choice, and firms audited by Big4     
Variable         Liq1          Liq2    Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.026 2.19** 0.245 0.53 0.017 4.72*** 
SIZE 0.472 29.35*** 0.476 29.85*** 0.473 31.56*** 
RECINV 0.687 7.82*** 0.675 7.68*** 0.690 7.93*** 
LEV 0.063 1.66* 0.062 1.65* 0.062 1.64* 
ROA (0.152) (5.62)*** (0.152) (5.60)*** (0.153) (5.60)*** 
GC 0.122 2.20** 0.129 2.29** 0.123 2.16** 
MERGER 0.085 4.22*** 0.085 4.23*** 0.086 4.28*** 
RESTRUC 0.218 11.11*** 0.219 11.15*** 0.215 11.01*** 
SPECIAL 0.100 1.50 0.100 1.51 0.102 1.55 
MB 0.009 1.72* 0.010 1.68* 0.009 1.64* 
SEG 0.148 9.23*** 0.146 9.10*** 0.149 9.30*** 
ROANEG 0.102 5.13*** 0.104 5.16*** 0.102 5.11*** 
FOREIGN 0.036 1.64* 0.034 1.56 0.034 1.54 
INTERCEPT 10.694 45.74*** 10.567 46.6*** 10.575 49.27*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 6972  6972  6972  
Adj. R2 79.90%  79.86%  79.98%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: AC1 is the measure for audit choice, and firms audited by Non-Big4 firms 
Variable      Liq1     Liq2     Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.079 4.28*** 1.029 2.05** 0.004 2.57*** 
SIZE 0.470 14.29*** 0.481 14.93*** 0.488 16.42*** 
RECINV 0.229 1.99* 0.193 1.70* 0.200 1.76* 
LEV (0.016) (0.19) (0.039) (0.46) (0.036) (0.44) 
ROA (0.199) (4.46)*** (0.204) (4.59)*** (0.205) (4.64)*** 
GC 0.122 1.40 0.162 1.81* 0.154 1.72* 
MERGER 0.059 1.25 0.065 1.35 0.066 1.35 
RESTRUC 0.174 4.03*** 0.174 3.92*** 0.171 3.87*** 
SPECIAL 0.159 0.95 0.193 1.06 0.185 1.02 
MB (0.010) (2.66)*** (0.010) (2.79)*** (0.010) (2.49)*** 
SEG 0.188 6.14*** 0.183 5.90*** 0.184 5.89*** 
ROANEG 0.117 3.32*** 0.120 3.35*** 0.114 3.19*** 
FOREIGN 0.127 2.71*** 0.137 2.89*** 0.137 2.86*** 
INTERCEPT 10.443 22.89*** 9.932 20.83*** 9.877 22.11*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 2054  2054  2054  
Adj. R2 71.68%  71.11%  71.11%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 16 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees during Financial Crisis Period (AC2) 
 
Panel A: AC2 is the measure for audit choice, and firms audited by 
Industry specialist     
Variable Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.014 0.70 (0.204) (0.28) 0.015 2.11** 
BIG4 0.432 2.37** 0.449 2.45** 0.445 2.42** 
SIZE 0.490 36.97*** 0.493 36.45*** 0.490 37.46*** 
RECINV 0.773 5.79*** 0.770 5.76*** 0.784 5.93*** 
LEV 0.059 0.91 0.057 0.89 0.056 0.88 
ROA (0.323) (5.60)*** (0.319) (5.51)*** (0.336) (5.85)*** 
GC 0.059 0.86 0.061 0.89 0.062 0.89 
MERGER 0.097 2.48*** 0.098 2.54*** 0.096 2.47*** 
RESTRUC 0.234 7.08*** 0.234 7.10*** 0.232 7.06*** 
SPECIAL 0.116 1.08 0.121 1.13 0.117 1.10 
MB 0.040 3.54*** 0.042 3.65*** 0.040 3.54*** 
SEG 0.166 6.07*** 0.165 6.01*** 0.166 6.11*** 
ROANEG 0.069 1.80* 0.068 1.76* 0.066 1.73* 
FOREIGN 0.072 1.89* 0.070 1.86* 0.072 1.88* 
INTERCEPT 9.752 38.82*** 9.650 41.60*** 9.676 42.52*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 2145  2145  2145  
Adj. R2 83.52%  83.51%  83.55%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: AC2 is the measure for audit choice, and firms audited by Non-Industry 
Specialist 
Variable Liq1  Liq2  Liq3  
 Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
LiqN 0.054 4.94*** 0.929 2.46*** 0.008 5.55*** 
BIG4 0.336 12.26*** 0.348 12.52*** 0.347 12.65*** 
SIZE 0.463 54.79*** 0.469 55.96*** 0.471 58.10*** 
RECINV 0.443 5.81*** 0.415 5.45*** 0.432 5.68*** 
LEV 0.118 0.30 0.007 0.17 0.009 0.23 
ROA (0.153) (5.56)*** (0.154) (5.45)*** (0.153) (5.45)*** 
GC 0.140 2.44** 0.163 2.79*** 0.153 2.62*** 
MERGER 0.080 3.76*** 0.080 3.73*** 0.081 3.83*** 
RESTRUC 0.213 10.29*** 0.217 10.41*** 0.213 10.27*** 
SPECIAL 0.103 1.43 0.104 1.40 0.105 1.43 
MB (0.003) (0.81) (0.003) (0.79) (0.003) (0.65) 
SEG 0.156 9.62*** 0.153 9.40*** 0.154 9.46*** 
ROANEG 0.114 5.86*** 0.120 6.07*** 0.114 5.77*** 
FOREIGN 0.064 2.85*** 0.063 2.82*** 0.061 2.78*** 
INTERCEPT 10.569 73.70*** 10.300 75.47*** 10.262 77.78*** 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 6881  6881  6881  
Adj. R2 82.98%  82.78%  82.85%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 17 Stock Liquidity and Audit Choice (Two-Stage-Least Squares Regression) 
 
Panel A: Liq1 is the measure for the stock liquidity 
 1 stage                2 stage 
Variables             Liq1 AC1  AC2 
  Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.074 10.29*** 0.014 1.94* 
LagLiq 0.777 50.77***     
InLiq 0.376 17.03***     
SIZE 0.049 14.36*** 0.098 23.53*** 0.045 11.08*** 
LEV 0.016 0.71 0.000 0.00 (0.039) (1.70)* 
INV (0.234 (4.24)*** (0.352) (4.77)*** (0.048) (0.78) 
ROA (0.100) (3.72)*** (0.046) (2.47)*** (0.019) (1.73)* 
GROWTH 0.076 7.93*** (0.006) (1.20) (0.006) (1.38) 
LLOSS (0.019) (1.59) 0.024 2.13** 0.022 2.14** 
SEG (0.015) (2.43)*** (0.010) (1.14) 0.001 0.12 
CURR 0.010 0.56 0.001 0.55 (0.003) (1.92)* 
ATURN 0.010 1.26 0.011 1.03 0.015 1.57 
FOREIGN (0.021) (2.47)*** 0.046 3.76*** 0.004 0.36 
INTERCEPT 0.435 3.77*** 0.516 9.33*** 0.006 0.11 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 19113  18345  18345  
Adj. R2 71.14%  32.41%  6.58%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: Liq2 is the measure for the stock liquidity   
 1 stage                  2 stage 
Variables             Liq2 AC1  AC2 
  Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  2.773 7.30*** 0.757 2.73*** 
LagLiq 0.604 8.62***     
InLiq 0.343 54.88***     
SIZE (0.003) (20.67)*** 0.094 20.25*** 0.043 9.45*** 
LEV 0.003 3.05 0.011 0.46 (0.036) (1.54) 
INV 0.004 1.69 (0.402) (5.43)*** (0.056) (0.91) 
ROA (0.003) (3.29)*** (0.070) (3.71)*** (0.024) (2.20)** 
GROWTH (0.002) (6.61)*** (0.004) (0.73) (0.006) (1.44) 
LLOSS 0.005 11.33*** 0.054 4.79*** 0.030 2.89*** 
SEG 0.000 1.50 (0.012) (1.36) 0.001 0.10 
CURR 0.000 0.64 0.002 0.94 (0.002) (1.84)* 
ATURN 0.000 (1.46) 0.011 1.01 0.014 1.54 
FOREIGN 0.001 2.33*** 0.045 3.70*** 0.005 0.38 
INTERCEPT 0.020 14.36*** 0.232 5.55*** (0.029) (0.76 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
No. of 
Observations 19113  18345  18345  
Adj. R2 56.44%  31.81%  6.59%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel C: Liq3 is the measure for the stock liquidity   
 1 stage          2 stage       
Variables Liq3   AC1    AC2   
  Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.025 7.79*** 0.008 5.00*** 
LagLiq 0.422 18.78***     
InLiq 1.410 2.10**     
SIZE (0.238) (11.26)*** 0.104 25.03*** 0.045 11.71*** 
LEV 0.215 1.98* 0.000 (0.02) (0.038) (1.65)* 
INV 2.148 4.48*** (0.336) (4.49)*** (0.034) (0.56) 
ROA 0.264 1.95* (0.056) (3.09)*** (0.020) (1.78)* 
GROWTH (0.213) (4.43)*** (0.002) (0.38) (0.006) (1.34) 
LLOSS 0.182 2.71*** 0.033 2.95*** 0.024 2.34*** 
SEG 0.068 1.86* (0.012) (1.26) 0.001 0.13 
CURR (0.008) (0.54) 0.002 0.93 (0.003) (1.84)* 
ATURN 0.065 1.03 0.015 1.39 0.016 1.68* 
FOREIGN (0.115) (2.59)*** 0.037 3.03*** 0.002 0.17 
INTERCEPT 1.504 9.67*** 0.110 3.10*** (0.060) (1.99)* 
Industry Fixed 
Effects yes  yes  yes  
Year Fixed 
Effects yes  yes  yes  
No. of 
Observations 19113  18345  18345  
Adj. R2 24.64%  31.63%  6.59%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 18 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees (AC1 and Two-Stage-Least Squares 
Regression) 
Panel A: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq1 and firms audited by Big4 firms 
 1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.060 4.25*** 
LagLiq 0.804 62.83***   
InLiq 0.330 11.21***   
SIZE 0.031 8.55*** 0.472 45.44*** 
RECINV (0.102) (2.82)*** 0.743 9.49*** 
LEV 0.011 0.56 0.027 0.73 
ROA (0.047) (1.13) (0.173) (5.47)*** 
GC 0.068 1.41 0.152 3.37*** 
MERGER 0.011 1.26 0.074 5.21*** 
RESTRUC 0.002 0.26 0.202 13.02*** 
SPECIAL 0.029 0.90 (0.051) (1.06) 
MB 0.008 1.05 0.004 1.54 
SEG (0.011) (1.77)* 0.140 9.98*** 
ROANEG (0.008) (0.53) 0.117 7.19*** 
FOREIGN (0.027) (3.00)*** 0.032 1.72 
INTERCEPT 0.500 2.59*** 11.000 54.57*** 
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 15032  15092  
Adj. R2 71.92%  80.21%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq2 and firms audited by Big4 firms 
 1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.568 1.02 
LagLiq 0.604  29.88***    
InLiq 0.297  6.75***    
SIZE (0.002) (15.17)*** 0.479  46.33***  
RECINV 0.001  0.71  0.709  9.04***  
LEV 0.001  1.72*  0.021  0.56  
ROA (0.005) (4.37)*** (0.177) (5.55)*** 
GC 0.005  2.19**  0.176  3.77***  
MERGER (0.001) (4.01)*** 0.074  5.21***  
RESTRUC 0.001  3.45***  0.203  12.98***  
SPECIAL (0.002) (1.51) (0.048) (1.00) 
MB (0.001) (1.95)* 0.004  1.41  
SEG (0.000) (0.51) 0.136  9.70***  
ROANEG 0.005  9.58***  0.125  7.51***  
FOREIGN 0.001  4.19***  0.031  1.66  
INTERCEPT 0.010  2.12**  10.646  67.66***  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 15032  15092  
Adj. R2 56.65%   80.11%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel C: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq3 and firms audited by Big4 firms 
 1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.037  4.32***  
LagLiq 0.473  13.41***    
InLiq 0.858  2.21**    
SIZE (0.081) (5.86)*** 0.476  49.84***  
RECINV 0.396  2.98***  0.735  9.49***  
LEV 0.019  0.36  0.020  0.55  
ROA 0.084  1.37  (0.172) (5.45)*** 
GC (0.149) (2.13)** 0.162  3.52***  
MERGER (0.006) (0.20) 0.074  5.25***  
RESTRUC (0.075) (2.60)** 0.197  12.77***  
SPECIAL 0.076  2.08**  (0.044) (0.92) 
MB (0.013) (1.56) 0.004  1.35  
SEG 0.046  2.16**  0.139  9.96***  
ROANEG 0.106  2.56***  0.123  7.52***  
FOREIGN (0.002) (0.08) 0.029  1.57  
INTERCEPT 0.694  3.09***  10.671  20.85***  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 15032  15092  
Adj. R2 27.06%   80.18%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel D: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq1 and firms audited by Non-Big4 firms 
 1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.080  4.32***  
LagLiq 0.709  32.42***    
InLiq 0.501  6.62***    
SIZE 0.061  5.67***  0.455  29.62***  
RECINV (0.201) (2.93)*** 0.203  2.25**  
LEV (0.095) (2.11)** 0.076  1.33  
ROA (0.048) (1.36) (0.108) (3.53)*** 
GC 0.172  2.53**  0.168  2.95***  
MERGER 0.026  1.06  0.059  2.11**  
RESTRUC (0.019) (0.71) 0.170  6.10***  
SPECIAL 0.070  0.63  0.005  0.06  
MB 0.001  0.33  (0.006) (3.30)*** 
SEG (0.028) (1.59) 0.158  6.11***  
ROANEG (0.022) (0.86) 0.111  4.16***  
FOREIGN 0.021  0.87  0.119  3.33***  
INTERCEPT 0.514  1.04  10.030  16.77 *** 
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 4416  4486  
Adj. R2 61.90%   71.81%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel E: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq2 and firms audited by Non-Big4 firms 
 1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  1.915 2.75*** 
LagLiq 0.535 27.75***   
InLiq 0.285 2.31**   
SIZE (0.005) (11.15)*** 0.454 17.03*** 
RECINV 0.005 2.09** 0.172 1.93* 
LEV 0.003 1.03 0.057 1.02 
ROA (0.002) (0.98) (0.122) (3.94)*** 
GC (0.001) (0.39) 0.198 3.42*** 
MERGER 0.001 0.81 0.066 2.37** 
RESTRUC 0.000 0.31 0.171 6.11*** 
SPECIAL 0.006 1.51 0.031 0.41 
MB (0.000) (2.59)*** (0.007) (3.80)*** 
SEG 0.001 1.64* 0.156 6.01*** 
ROANEG 0.006 6.03*** 0.132 4.97*** 
FOREIGN (0.000) (0.49) 0.123 3.43*** 
INTERCEPT 0.017 1.36 9.626 21.39*** 
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 4416  4486  
Adj. R2 53.10%  71.54%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel F: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq3 and firms audited by Non-Big4  
 1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.012 2.92*** 
LagLiq 0.386  14.64***    
InLiq 26.028  1.13    
SIZE (0.694) (8.23)*** 0.461  19.56***  
RECINV 2.654  4.08***  0.198  2.20**  
LEV 1.094  2.35**  0.065  1.12  
ROA 0.159  0.64  (0.118) (3.67)*** 
GC (0.531) (1.06) 0.183  3.14***  
MERGER 0.086  0.47  0.062  2.22**  
RESTRUC (0.036) (0.15) 0.169  6.04***  
SPECIAL (0.455) (0.59) 0.015  0.19  
MB (0.014) (0.94) (0.007) (3.17)*** 
SEG 0.173  1.15  0.157  6.03***  
ROANEG 0.175  0.85  0.118  4.42***  
FOREIGN (0.231) (1.26) 0.119  3.30***  
INTERCEPT 2.226  1.35  9.537  21.31***  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 4416  4486  
Adj. R2 27.73%   71.52%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 19 Stock Liquidity and Audit Fees (AC2 and Two-Stage-Least Square 
Regression) 
Panel A: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq1 and firms audited by Industry Specialist 
     1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.041 2.10** 
LagLiq 0.801  30.86***    
InLiq 0.316  5.94***    
BIG4 0.767  2.46***  0.421  1.79* 
SIZE 0.026  4.66***  0.492  49.74***  
RECINV (0.105) (1.34) 0.752  6.97***  
LEV 0.005  0.71  0.027  0.46  
ROA 0.071  1.16  (0.340) (6.31) 
GC 0.032  0.39  0.122  1.52  
MERGER (0.002) (0.09) 0.064  2.84***  
RESTRUC 0.003  0.31  0.209  9.15***  
SPECIAL (0.003) (0.11) (0.057) (0.72) 
MB 0.036  4.70***  0.020  2.42**  
SEG (0.005) 0.43) 0.140  6.66***  
ROANEG 0.007  0.37  0.086  3.04***  
FOREIGN (0.026) (1.66)* 0.057  1.96*  
INTERCEPT 0.297  1.71*  10.382  33.73***  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 4736  4756  
Adj. R2 72.36%   82.91%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel B: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq2 and firms audited by Industry Specialist 
    1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  (0.100) (0.11) 
LagLiq 0.602  21.89***    
InLiq 0.325  4.52***    
BIG 4 (0.016) (1.03) 0.444  1.81*  
SIZE (0.002) (10.35)*** 0.499  47.55***  
RECINV 0.001  0.56  0.742  6.81***  
LEV 0.002  1.43  0.024  0.41  
ROA (0.010) (4.38)*** (0.341) (6.14)*** 
GC (0.001) (0.24) 0.132  1.54  
MERGER (0.002) (2.80)*** 0.064  2.86***  
RESTRUC 0.001  1.66*  0.212  9.20***  
SPECIAL (0.007) (2.09)** (0.052) (0.66) 
MB (0.002) (7.53)*** 0.022  2.54***  
SEG 0.000  (0.33) 0.137  6.48***  
ROANEG 0.003  4.20*** 0.090  3.08***  
FOREIGN 0.001  2.03**  0.053  1.83*  
INTERCEPT 0.030  1.84*  10.562  35.12***  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 4736  4756  
Adj. R2 57.54%   82.94%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		 68	
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq3 and firms audited by Industry Specialist 
 1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.058  2.46***  
LagLiq 0.375  5.49***    
InLiq 1.490  1.12    
BIG 4 0.145  0.76  0.450  1.84*  
SIZE (0.061) (3.18)*** 0.492  50.43***  
RECINV 0.530  2.13**  0.790  7.40***  
LEV 0.059  0.80  0.029  0.50  
ROA (0.389) (1.45) (0.375) (6.78)*** 
GC (0.162) (0.76) 0.120  1.42  
MERGER (0.053) (1.12) 0.059  2.65***  
RESTRUC (0.022) (0.38) 0.209  9.17***  
SPECIAL 0.079  1.22  (0.057) (0.73) 
MB (0.038) (2.89) 0.020  2.43***  
SEG 0.040  1.73  0.141  6.67***  
ROANEG (0.037) (0.60) 0.087  3.04***  
FOREIGN (0.009) (0.23) 0.054  1.87*  
INTERCEPT (0.223) (0.65) 10.133  36.43***  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 4736  4756  
Adj. R2 19.73%   82.99%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel D: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq1 and firms audited by Non-Industry Specialist 
 1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.068  6.13***  
LagLiq 0.770  69.71***    
InLiq 0.389  11.13***    
BIG 4 0.628  4.69***  0.358  15.41***  
SIZE 0.039  11.64***  0.458  63.51***  
RECINV (0.152) (4.11)*** 0.481  7.53***  
LEV (0.017) (0.71) 0.035  1.04  
ROA (0.036) (1.29) (0.120) (5.30)*** 
GC 0.130  2.93***  0.166  4.24***  
MERGER 0.013  1.30  0.080  5.58***  
RESTRUC 0.003  0.35  0.203  13.15***  
SPECIAL 0.054  1.27  (0.040) (0.93) 
MB 0.002  0.83  (0.004) (1.30) 
SEG (0.018) (2.43)*** 0.146  10.63***  
ROANEG (0.006) (0.48) 0.114  7.70*** 
FOREIGN (0.013) (1.30) 0.060  3.31***  
INTERCEPT 0.426  1.89*  10.456  53.21***  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 14712  14822  
Adj. R2 70.68%   83.42%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel E: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq2 and firms audited by Non-Industry Specialist 
 1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  1.661  3.56***  
LagLiq 0.584  46.62***    
InLiq 0.290  5.67***   
BIG 4 (0.003) (5.41)*** 0.369  15.84***  
SIZE (0.002) (15.96)*** 0.460  61.50***  
RECINV 0.003  2.13**  0.445  7.00***  
LEV 0.002  1.70*  0.030  0.93  
ROA (0.003) (0.98) (0.132) (5.82)*** 
GC 0.003  1.85*  0.197  4.87***  
MERGER (0.001) (2.52)*** 0.080  5.41***  
RESTRUC 0.001  2.39***  0.206  13.28***  
SPECIAL 0.001  0.76  (0.032) (0.75) 
MB 0.000  (3.72)*** (0.005) (1.52) 
SEG 0.000  1.35  0.143  10.43***  
ROANEG 0.005  9.95***  0.133  8.89***  
FOREIGN 0.001  1.46  0.060  3.26***  
INTERCEPT 0.012  2.05**  10.100  56.55***  
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 14712  14822  
Adj. R2 58.96%   83.25%   
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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Panel F: Stock liquidity’s measure is Liq3 and firms audited by Non-Industry Specialist 
 1 stage   2 stage   
Variables Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 
PrLiq  0.186 5.09*** 
LagLiq 0.434 19.42***   
InLiq 1.081 1.92*   
BIG 4 (0.474) (5.80)*** 0.364 15.62*** 
SIZE (0.205) (8.59)*** 0.464 66.28*** 
RECINV 1.569 5.07*** 0.481 7.53*** 
LEV 0.453 2.18** 0.036 1.06 
ROA 0.024 0.15 (0.125) (5.37)*** 
GC (0.159) (0.55) 0.179 4.44*** 
MERGER (0.027) (0.05) 0.079 5.54*** 
RESTRUC (0.122) (1.94) 0.201 12.99*** 
SPECIAL (0.047) (0.22) (0.032) (0.75) 
MB (0.012) (1.44) (0.004) (1.26) 
SEG 0.110 2.28** 0.145 10.56*** 
ROANEG 0.146 1.65* 0.121 8.17*** 
FOREIGN (0.940) (1.66)* 0.054 2.99*** 
INTERCEPT 1.600 3.64*** 10.044 55.80*** 
Industry Fixed Effects yes  yes  
Year Fixed Effects yes  yes  
No. of Observations 14712  14822  
Adj. R2 27.05%  83.27%  
 
*The t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (two-tailed test). T-statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by a firm are shown in parentheses. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Variables Description 
ACN 
Liq1 
1 if the firm is audited by Big4 or Industry Specialist, 0 otherwise; 
The logarithm of the ratio of total shares traded annually divided by share 
outstanding; 
Liq2 The percentage of zero daily returns with positive trading volume divided 
by the number of trading days over the firm's fiscal year, and then 
multiply it by -1; 
Liq3 
 
 
SIZE 
The logarithm of the Average over the ratio of absolute value of stock 
return on day t divided by dollar volume on day t, and then multiply it by 
-1; 
Nature logarithm of Total assets at the end of the fiscal year; 
LEV Book value of total debt divided by the total assets at the end of the fiscal 
year; 
INV The ratio of inventory to total assets; 
ROA Firm’s return-on-assets ratio calculated as net income divided by total 
assets; 
GROWTH The sales growth ratio in the past year; 
LLOSS 1 if the firm reports a negative income, and zero otherwise; 
SEG Square root of the number of segments disclosed;  
CURR Current asset divided by current liabilities; 
ATURN Net sales divided by total assets; 
FOREIGN 1 if the firm has foreign operations, and 0 otherwise; 
LAUDF Natural logarithm of audit fees; 
ICW 1 if the firm received an adverse opinion for material weaknesses in 
internal control, and 0 otherwise; 
BIG 4 1 if the firm is audited by Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, or 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and 0 otherwise; 
MERGER 1 if the firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition, and 0 otherwise 
MB Market-to-book ratio, defined as its total asset minus book value, plus the 
market value of equity, then divided by total asset; 
GC 1 if the firm received a going concern opinion, and 0 otherwise. 
RECINV Sum of the firm’s receivables and inventory divided by its total assets; 
SPECIAL 1 if the firm reports special items, and 0 otherwise 
RESTRUC 1 if the firm takes a restructuring charge, and 0 otherwise 
ROANEG 1 if the firm’s ROA is negative; and 0 otherwise 
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